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The Downward Spiral:  
Negative Cash Flow in Low Income Housing Tax Credit Properties 
 
(Under the direction of Dr. Roberto Quercia) 
 
For the past twenty-five years the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) has been the 
primary source of federally subsidized affordable rental housing production in the United 
States. The program is market-oriented in financing and operations. Tax incentives are 
used to attract private investment to projects, and competed projects are expected to be 
self-sufficient. Although there are rent limits and tenant income restrictions, LIHTC 
projects often compete against the open market for tenants. This market based structure, 
combined with several other financing provisions places extraordinary strain on projects 
to maintain sufficient cash flow levels. A 2004 report indicated an increasing number of 
projects were unable to do so. 
 
This report finds that a large number of LIHTC projects do experience cash flow 
problems of some magnitude. A common method of addressing cash shortfalls is to draw 
upon funds budgeted for routine repairs and maintenance to support other operating 
needs. This report finds that the strategy simply leads to declining property conditions 
and lower occupancy and rents. The low occupancy and rent levels drag down revenue, 
which exacerbates cash flow problems, beginning a downward spiral of physical and 
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1) What is the Low Income Housing Tax Credit? 
The Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) is currently the only federal program subsidizing 
the construction and rehabilitation of affordable rental housing. Rather than provide a direct 
subsidy to developers the program relies on tax incentives to attract private investment in 
affordable housing. One of the program‘s original goals was to bring the efficiency and 
discipline of the private market to affordable housing development and operations. Projects are 
expected to be financially self-sufficient. They must attract tenants in a competitive marketplace 
and ultimately they are accountable to investors. ―Investor participation is expected to add 
further oversight to the program, since return to the investors is dependent on the project‘s 
staying in compliance.‖ (Cummings & DiPasquale, 1999) LIHTC has been extraordinarily 
successful at creating and preserving affordable housing. In 2007 it contributed to an estimated 
125,000 affordable units, accounting for 90% of affordable rental housing developed. 
(Cummings P. , 2007) 
 
2) Impetus for Research 
LIHTC projects are relatively low-risk investments. Sites typically have high occupancy, 
acceptable debt coverage ratios (DCR),
1
 and extremely low foreclosure rates. However, a 2004 
report indicated the incidence of negative cash flow
2
 was rising rapidly. (Multi-Housing News, 
2004) In other words, an increasing percentage of projects had expenses that exceeded their 
revenue. 
 
Negative cash flow is a serious concern for any real estate, particularly LIHTC properties.  Any 
site with consistent cash flow problems may not be able to meet its debt obligations, may have to 
defer maintenance, and has no cushion if something goes wrong. LIHTC projects also run the 
risk of falling out of federal compliance and losing their tax benefits. Enterprise Community 
Investment, Inc. (Enterprise) commissioned this study to identify factors associated with 
negative cash flow in their tax credit portfolio. Enterprise is one of the largest and most well-
                                                 
1
 Debt Coverage Ratio measures a property‘s ability to pay its debt. DCR=Net Operating Income / Debt Service. Net 
Operating Income (NOI) = Revenue – Expenses. Debt Service is payments on debt. 
2
 Negative Cash Flow occurs when cash outflow from operating expenses and debt service exceeds cash inflow. 
2 
 
regarded real estate investment services companies for affordable housing, with a large national 
portfolio of LIHTC properties. (Organizational Profile in Appendix 1) 
 
3) Hypothesis 
Exploratory statistical analysis of Enterprise‘s portfolio indicated that a ―downward spiral‖ of 
project financial and physical conditions might exist in troubled LIHTC sites. Properties already 
experiencing financial difficulties cut back on funding intended for repairs and maintenance, 
possibly reallocating it to other parts of the budget. The result is falling gross potential rent
3
 and 
occupancy, presumably because the physical property condition has declined. Lower rents and 
occupancy translate into lower revenue, which exacerbates the original cash flow problem.  
 
II. Literature Review and Interviews 
 
LIHTC was created as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Its basic premise is to ―offer federal 
tax credits to private investors in return for their providing equity for the development of 
affordable rental housing.‖ (Cummings & DiPasquale, 1999) The program‘s first few years were 
marked by uncertainty but Congress made it permanent in 1993. Since that time it has become 
the primary production vehicle for low-income rental housing in the United States (Narron, 
2004) with an estimated 1.5 million units placed in service since the program‘s inception. 
(Usowski & Hollar, 2008) 
 
1) Program Mechanics 
Each year Congress allocates tax credits to 
states and a few local jurisdictions on a 
per capita basis, currently $2.20. (North 
Carolina Housing Finance Agency, 2009) 
The administering state or local agency 
then allocates credits to developers 
(formally referred to as ―sponsors‖) of 
                                                 
3
Gross Potential Rents are the total rents that would be collected by the property if all units were leased with no rent 
concessions (e.g. leasing specials). 
Figure 1: LIHTC Program Structure 



















projects that will create or retain affordable rental housing. (McClure, 2000) Projects must 
reserve at least 40% of units for households earning at or below 60% of Area Median Income 
(AMI)
4
 or 30% to households at or below 50% of AMI and meet other federal program 
requirements and state priorities as articulated in the Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP).
5
 Units 
must remain affordable for at least 15 years. Eligible projects may receive credits for up to 9% of 
eligible construction and / or property acquisition costs or 4% of land acquisition costs for 
affordable units annually for ten years.
6
 (Enterprise Community Investment, Inc., 2006)  
 
LIHTC is unique among existing federal production-side
7
 support initiatives for affordable rental 
housing in that it does not provide a direct subsidy.  Instead, it encourages private investment in 
affordable housing by providing credits against owners‘ tax liabilities for a period of ten years. 
(Usowski & Hollar, 2008) Sponsors with urgent capital needs effectively sell 99.9% of credits 
and other project tax benefits to investors for ten years in return for an immediate
8
 equity 
infusion. The legal mechanism through which the credit transfer occurs, a Limited Partnership,
9
 
results in joint ownership of the project. The sponsor contributes the property and the tax credits 
to the partnership. They are responsible for all project management functions: retaining and 
overseeing the development and management teams, assembling the financing, and assuming 
most of the risk. In the context of the partnership the sponsor is known as the General Partner. 
The investors contribute equity equal to the total value of tax credits multiplied by some market-
driven price. They receive the tax credits and most other project tax losses over the course of ten 
years. Investors are known as Limited Partners in the context of the partnership. Limited Partners 
are typically uninvolved in daily management, and are insulated from performance issues unless 
the site becomes insolvent or is out of compliance with regulatory requirements. (Paul, 2007) 
 
                                                 
4
 Area Median Income (AMI) refers to the Census-defined median income for a given area. Income as a percentage 
of AMI is used as a eligibility test for many federal programs. 
5
 The Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP) is a state-level document detailing the selection criteria and application 
requirements for housing tax credits and tax-exempt bonds. 
6
 Projects with only 4% credits (―bond deals‖) often have different financial structures than 9% deals. All projects in 
analyzed in this study include 9% credits. 
7
 Federal rental assistance programs fall into two categories. Supply or production side programs subsidize the 
creation of housing, while demand side programs offer rental subsidies directly to low-income households. 
8
 ―Immediate‖ typically means over the course of development and lease-up  
9
 A Limited Partnership is a business organization with general partners who manage the business and assume legal 
debts and obligations, and limited partners, who are liable only to the extent of their investments. Limited partners 
enjoy rights to the partnership's cash flow, or in the case of tax credits, its tax losses. 
4 
 
A project seldom realizes economic benefits exactly equal to the dollar value of the credits 
allocated. In early 2009 credit prices in strong markets were around $0.79 (Kimura, 2009) so a 
project with an allocation of $1 million in credits might receive $790,000 from Limited Partners 
($1 million x $0.79). In return, the investors would receive a $100,000 dollar-for-dollar write-
down on their taxes plus any other tax losses the project realized annually for ten years. 
(Abravanel & Johnson, 1999) 
 
The benefits received by investors from LIHTC properties are different than those achieved in 
traditional real estate investments, which impacts the way projects are underwritten.
10
 In 
traditional real estate investors receive a share of cash flows annually and at disposition.
11
  
Therefore, they have a vested interest in the property attracting tenants at the highest possible 
rents and eventually attracting a high sale price. (Geltner, Miller, Eichholtz, & Clayton, 2006) 
LIHTC investments, on the other hand, are tax shelters. The number of credits investors receive 
annually is fixed and will not change unless there are serious noncompliance issues. (Enterprise 
Community Investment, Inc., 2006) From this perspective, an investor‘s maximizing strategy 
would focus on simply keeping the site in compliance.  
 
 Investors ―may also claim the 




other income. While this tends 
to increase the amount paid for 
LIHTC investments, it also 
reinforces the need to operate LIHTC projects as close to zero net cash flow as possible.‖ 
(Usowski & Hollar, 2008) This further distinguishes them from traditional investors who strive 
                                                 
10
 Underwriting refers to the process by which investors determine if they will assume the financial risk of investing 
in a project. In the context of LIHTC, a development, income and expense budget is created and projected out for 
the life of the partnership. 
11
 Disposition refers to sale of the property. 
12
 Projects are permitted to take tax deductions for certain line items. The most noteworthy are interest payments on 
debt and depreciation. Depreciation refers to the concept that the physical components of the property (its 
―depreciable basis‖) will not last infinitely. For tax purposes the useful life of components in a LIHTC building is 
27.5 years. A property may take a deduction equal to the depreciable basis divided by 27.5 each year. 
Figure 2: Calculating Tax Losses 
Cash Flow Calculations  Tax Assessment 
Revenue $100,000  Before Tax Cash Flow $10,000 
Less Expenses    ($985,000)   Less deductions      ($60,000) 
= NOI $15,000  = Taxable Income ($50,000) 
Less Debt Service ($5,000)   x Tax Rate - 
= Before Tax Cash Flow $10,000  = Tax Burden / Loss ($50,000) 
5 
 
for high cash flows. Tax losses typically flow from depreciation and interest deductions. (See 
Figure 2 for a calculation of tax losses.)  
 
2) LIHTC as a Market-Based Program 
It cannot be emphasized enough that LIHTC is a market-driven program. Affordable housing had 
come to be characterized in popular mentality as slum housing, inhabited by the poorest of the 
poor. The constant demand for operating subsidies was perceived as a drain on tax dollars to 
support housing that was blight on cities. LIHTC was a reaction against that. (Daye, et al., 1999) 
LIHTC was not only intended to seek financing in a more market-based model, it was supposed 
to operate in a market context. Unlike Section 8 and other programs that receive subsidies on an 
ongoing basis, LIHTC only receives a construction subsidy. In other words, the rents the site 
may charge are limited, but they are often fairly close to market rents, and the band of income-
eligible tenants is often very narrow. (Usowski & Hollar, 2008) LIHTC properties must often 
compete in the open market against traditional properties charging similar rents to attract tenants 
from a much smaller pool.  
 
3) Program Strengths 
The most often-cited benefits of the LIHTC program relate to its extraordinary success as a 
vehicle for affordable housing creation. ―LIHTC projects account for nearly 90% of all 
affordable rental housing developed today.‖ (Cummings P. , 2007) Many LIHTC developers 
claim their projects would not have been feasible without credits, which ―can typically raise 
somewhere between 50 to 60 percent of the total project costs through equity.‖ (Duell & Myers, 
2004) 
 
Proponents also suggest that the program allows the government to fund more affordable 
housing than it could with a direct subsidy because the government experiences the financial 
impact over ten years while the development realizes the benefit immediately. (Anthony, 2009) 
Detractors respond the program is inefficient because projects do not realize the full benefit of 




Program supporters also argue that LIHTC is a low risk, effective investment vehicle for 
companies seeking tax losses (Rhine, 2008) and units are very high quality initially. (McAdie, 
2009) LIHTC‘s application of market efficiencies to affordable housing is another both as a 
program strength and weakness. 
 
4) Challenges 
Management, market, physical plant, and underwriting are four commonly-cited concerns in real 
estate development and operations. LIHTC‘s major challenges are rooted in these issues as well.  
 
A) Management 
The LIHTC program is complex and requires a great deal of administrative time and expertise to 
manage. A study of property owners who only used tax credits once found their major reasons 
for not participating in the program on an ongoing basis were ―perceptions of excessive rules or 
regulations, too much paperwork, or general difficulties in using the credit...  Some believed the 
tax-credit program was simply ‗too tough.‘‖ (Abravanel & Johnson, 1999) 
 
LIHTC property management entails all the work of traditional property management such as 
leasing, rent collections and maintenance. The failure to do this part of the job well can result in 
long vacancies, poor physical property condition, and nonpayment of rent to name a few 
challenges. (Bratt, Schwartz, Keyes, Stockard, & Vidal, 1998)  However, managing a LIHTC 
property also encompasses time consuming work such as certifying tenants‘ income, submitting 
to regular property reviews, and meeting other compliance regulations. A successful property 
manager will also file applications for rent increases and tax relief to assist the property. For 
many property managers the demand major challenge is managing the property at zero net-
revenue. (Tatum, 2009) Research suggests that even with these difficulties property management 
is not the greatest systemic problem for LIHTC properties. (Multi-Housing News, 2004) A study 
by Bratt et al concluded that ―day-to-day property management in the sampled developments is 







The market-based LIHTC program requires properties to compete for tenants on the open 
market. Sponsors undertake feasibility studies measuring likely demand among the eligible 
market share and the project‘s ability to operate on the resulting income. (North Carolina 
Housing Finance Agency, 2009) However, many projects are still sited in less-than-ideal 
locations for reasons such as state allocation priorities or market changes. (Cummings & 
DiPasquale, 1998) One common market challenge results when the rent level necessary to make 
a project feasible is so close to market rate the site is no longer desirable from the perspective of 
affordability. (Martin M. , 2009) 
 
Even in strong markets, marketing is essential. In particular, the curb appeal – how a building 
looks from the street or during a casual walk-through – is important. ―First impressions are 
lasting impressions. How it looks when you come in can create in your mind a lot of your 
perception about how things will be handled in the future.‖ (Tatum, 2009) There is wide 
variation in the priority placed physical appearance. For example, ―in North Carolina… it‘s got 
curb appeal up the wazoo. In Massachusetts, even to decorate a management office was a 
struggle because the perception in the public sector was that it was a misuse of funds.‖ (Tatum, 
2009)  The greatest issues relate to maintaining rather than creating a marketable product. Bratt 
et al found that most of the LIHTC properties in their study had ―curb appeal greater than other 
properties in their neighborhoods‖ initially. However, inadequacy of cash flow and reserves 
precluded preventative maintenance and repairs. Over time, the quality of the building degraded. 
(Bratt, Schwartz, Keyes, Stockard, & Vidal, 1998) 
 
C) Physical Plant13 
The physical condition of a building and its systems are critical to facilitating marketing and 
stabilizing costs. New construction is usually high quality and seldom experiences serious 
problems in the first five to seven years of its life. Rehabilitated properties are much more likely 
to run into trouble early (Floreani, 2007) particularly because their core systems may not last as 
long as projected. Regardless of the construction type and quality all projects need routine 
                                                 
13
 Typically physical plant refers to a building‘s systems such as HVAC. Here it refers to the entire physical 
property, not only its systems. 
8 
 
maintenance on an ongoing basis and larger work at some point. (Bratt, Schwartz, Keyes, 
Stockard, & Vidal, 1998) 
 
The financial structure of the LIHTC program allows for neglect of the physical plant in several 
ways. Real Estate Policy and Asset Management Consultant Len Tatum cites the length of 
investor involvement as one issue. He explains ―the investment horizon in the market sector is 
much shorter.
14
 It‘s always someone else‘s. Put it up, fill it up, flip it is the mentality. Because of 
that there‘s a lot of focus on the curb appeal‖ in order to show potential purchasers the property 
is a good investment. (Tatum, 2009) LIHTC investments are held for twice as long and often 
have pre-identified buyers. On an annual basis the financial structure favors keeping properties in 
compliance rather than in excellent condition since the goal is to realize zero net cash flow. As 
discussed in the marketing section, this tends to lead to a slow degradation of the building.  
 
The most serious challenge to the physical plant is the tendency for the preventative maintenance 
and repairs budget to be used for other purposes. ―Faced with income insufficient to cover 
operating costs, property owners tap ‗other available funds‘ [such as maintenance funds] to pay 
the bills.... At best, they are a stop-gap solution to the problem of negative cash flow; at worst, 
their use can lead to new problems.‖ (Bratt, Schwartz, Keyes, Stockard, & Vidal, 1998)  
 
D) Underwriting 
LIHTC attempts to serve a range of different interests. States wish to serve a social purpose often 
with the lowest possible rents. Sponsors may have the same interest, but also need the project to 
be financially feasible. Investors wish to make their required return. (Cummings & DiPasquale, 
1998) Attempting to serve all these disparate interests inevitably creates underwriting problems. 
 
Many properties operate ―thin‖, with small provisions for administrative and marketing costs and 
very little cushion. Problems are inevitable. Certain expenses like taxes, insurance, utilities may 
fluctuate uncontrollably, the market may change, or major repairs may be necessary. (Stegman, 
1999) Sponsors may also be overly optimistic as they forecast revenue and expenses moving 
forward. Many underwriters admit that projections more than five years into the future are 
                                                 
14
 Traditional real estate investments are usually sold after five years, while LIHTC properties are held for ten years. 
9 
 
notoriously unreliable. (Usowski & Hollar, 2008) Properties may also be overleveraged
15
. In 
states like Minnesota where a great deal of soft debt
16
 is available projects fare relatively well but 
elsewhere debt service may be burdensome. (Stegman, 1999) 
 
One popular view is that well-capitalized reserves will provide the necessary cushion for these 
potential underwriting woes (Bratt, Schwartz, Keyes, Stockard, & Vidal, 1998), (McAdie, 2009), 
but Tatum disagrees. He claims underwriters need to recognize that many properties have 
insufficient revenue to capitalize reserves. Furthermore, he thinks owners should reinvest in a 
property on an ongoing basis to keep it in excellent condition rather than leaving untouched 
reserves as a hedge against total collapse at a mediocre property. (Tatum, 2009) Regardless of 
whether reserves are the correct response, thin budgets are a serious challenge for LIHTC 
projects. 
 
5) The Downward Spiral 
The worst challenges are often the result of more than one issue. A project may experience poor 
cash flow performance in a given year for any number of factors impacting revenue or expenses. 
A unique occurrence of cash shortfall is typically not very serious but ―repeated practice of 
spending more money than is taken in will eventually have devastating results.‖ When owners 
and managers follow the common practice of filling budget holes with money intended for 
repairs and maintenance, preventative upkeep is neglected. The building degrades, slowly 
increasing operating expenses (Bratt, Schwartz, Keyes, Stockard, & Vidal, 1998) and decreasing 
rental income. The problem was best described by Michael Martin, Senior Vice President at 
Winn Residential. He claimed serious problems can stem from any cost fluctuation or even poor 
underwriting that leads to ―a lack of available funds.  You sort of wind up in the spiral of ‗I don‘t 
have enough funds to keep the property looking great, so then I can‘t get the highest achievable 
rent possible for that market place; oops, and my occupancy slips as well. You wind up with 
slightly lower rents and slightly lower occupancy, but those add up to quite a bit. You wind up in 
this spiral – a downwards spiral.‖ (Martin M. , 2009) 
 
                                                 
15
 Leverage refers to the level of debt a property has. 
16
 Soft debt refers to a loan with generous repayment terms. The loan may be forgivable if the property remains 






1) Data Source 
Project-level data on 1,002 LIHTC properties were gathered from Enterprise Community 
Investment, Inc.‘s tax credit syndication arm. Enterprise, a subsidiary of the Enterprise 
Foundation, is a national affordable housing financial services company. Data included 
descriptive, static information (e.g. location, construction type) and performance measures 
collected annually by Enterprise‘s asset managers (e.g. financial performance, occupancy). 
 
Projects were located in 47 states throughout the continental United States and in Alaska. Sixty-
three percent were located in urban areas, 16% in suburban areas, and 21% in rural areas. 
Projects represented all construction types: 56% were new construction, 27% were substantial 
rehabilitations, 13% were moderate rehabilitations, and 4% were some combination of types. 
Project sponsors included both non-profits (23%) and for-profits (77%). The portfolio 
represented sites targeting families (72%), people with special needs (32%), seniors (21%), and a 
few serving Native Americans and Single Room Occupancies (SROs). Many properties targeted 
more than one population. Projects ranged in size from six to 408 units, with an average of 55 
residential units. Properties with commercial income were excluded from the sample to ensure 
consistency of cash flow data. The sample included properties that had reached Qualified 
Occupancy (QO) between 1989 and 2006. Data was considered for properties beginning in the 
year after they achieved QO so results do not reflect any partial years of operation. All projects 
had 9% credits, and some also had 4% credits or historic tax credits. 
 
2) Variables 
The following is a list and explanation of variables analyzed at any point in the research. 
 Negative Cash Flow: a discrete variable that answers the question ‗is NOI minus debt 
service less than zero?‘ This is a good substitute for DCR, which cannot be used for 
projects with no debt service. 
 NOI Ratio: a continuous variable that represents the ratio of actual to projected NOI. 
Ratios were constructed for most financial variables because absolute dollar figures 
11 
 
indicate very little about a project if the underwriting budget allowed for them. 
Deviations from the budget indicate strength of performance. The NOI Ratio = Actual 
NOI / Projected NOI. For example, if actual NOI was $125 but the projection was $100 
the ratio would be: $100/ $125= 1.25. Projects with projected revenue less than zero were 
excluded from analysis because intentional negative cash flow skews results.  
 Revenue Ratio: a continuous variable representing the ratio of actual to projected 
revenue. 
 Gross Potential Rent Ratio: a continuous variable representing the ratio of actual to 
projected gross potential rents. Gross potential rents indicate the rental income of a 
project if all units were leased, so it is a good measure of the rent rates. 
 Vacancies and Concessions Ratio: a continuous variable representing the ratio of actual 
to projected revenue lost from vacant units and rent concessions (e.g. leasing specials). 
 Operating Expense Ratio: a continuous variable representing the ratio of actual to 
projected total operating expenses 
 Operating Expense Line Item Ratios: seven continuous variables representing the ratio 
of actual to projected expenses from the following line item expenses: administrative, 
utilities, maintenance and repairs (Repairs Ratio), real estate taxes (Taxes Ratio), 
insurance, management fees, and other expenses. 
 Occupancy: a continuous variable indicating the percent of units in the project that are 
leased. 
 Population: five discrete variables indicating whether the project is targeted to one of the 
following populations: families, seniors, Native Americans, people with special needs, 
SROs. Projects may serve more than one population. 
 Support Services: a discrete variable indicating whether the site provides support 
services. 
 Region: four discrete variables indicating which of Enterprise‘s service regions the site is 
located in: Northeast, Mid-Atlantic, Central, or West. 
 Construction Type: four discrete variables indicating whether the project was new 
construction, substantial rehabilitation, moderate rehabilitation, or a combination thereof. 
 Location: three discrete variables indicating if the project is located in an urban, 
suburban, or rural area. 
12 
 
 Physical Condition: four discrete variables indicating how Enterprise asset managers 
ranked the physical condition of the property in 2007: excellent, good, satisfactory, or 
poor. 
 Age: a continuous variable measuring the age of the project from qualified occupancy. 
 Sponsor Type: a discrete variable indicating whether the sponsor was a for-profit or non-
profit entity. 




Initial exploratory analyses indicated that the Operating Expense Ratio, Revenue Ratio, and 
Occupancy were all strongly associated with cash flow, and that Physical Property Condition 
was a critical control variable for explaining these three factors.  
 
A review of literature and interviews with practitioners from a cross section of the LIHTC 
industry were used to develop a hypothesis and focus further research. Geoffrey MacAdie, 
Portfolio Manager for Massachusetts Housing Partnership, offered a lender‘s perspective. Len 
Tatum, a Real Estate Policy and Asset Management Consultant, provided an asset manager‘s 
view point. Michael Martin, Senior Vice President of Winn Residential gave a property 
management company‘s perspective. Amy Anthony, President and Executive Director of 
Preservation of Affordable Housing provided an owner‘s point of view. (Biographies and 
organizational profiles in Appendix 2) 
 
The resulting hypothesis is premised on a downward spiral model: 
 
Properties experiencing financial difficulties often cut back on funding intended 
for repairs and maintenance. This leads to falling occupancy and rents, and 
corresponding lower revenues. The lower revenues exacerbate cash flow 





The model was tested with further data analysis, discussed below, and found to be supportable. 
 
IV. Findings from Exploratory Analyses17 
 
1) Identifying Important Factors 
Exploratory analyses were conducted using regressions based on two complementary dependent 
variables: Negative Cash Flow and NOI Ratio. Negative Cash Flow identified the most troubled 
projects and served the important function of accounting for whether a project could cover its 
debt service. The NOI Ratio provided a broader and more robust analysis of project performance. 
The two sets of analyses identified similar variables associated with cash flow. (See Appendix 3, 
Tables 1-4 for regression tables.) 
 The Revenue Ratio had a strong negative association with Negative Cash Flow and a 
strong positive association with the NOI Ratio. As the ratio of actual to projected revenue 
increased NOI also increased and the likelihood of cash flow being negative decreased. 
o The Gross Potential Rent Ratio had a strong positive association with the Revenue 
Ratio. Furthermore, by excluding the Revenue Ratio from the initial model The 
Gross Potential Rent Ratio had a strong positive association with Negative Cash 
Flow, and the NOI Ratio, suggesting the association with the Revenue Ratio 
served as a confounding variable. 
 The Operating Expense Ratio had a strong positive association with Negative Cash Flow 
and a strong negative association with the NOI Ratio. As the ratio of actual-to-projected 
operating expenses increased the likelihood of Negative Cash Flow increased and the 
NOI Ratio decreased. 
o The Repairs Ratio was a particularly significant line item. It had a strong positive 
association with Negative Cash Flow and a strong negative association with the 
NOI Ratio.  
 Occupancy had a strong positive association with the Revenue Ratio. Furthermore, by 
excluding the Revenue Ratio from the initial model Occupancy had a strong positive 
                                                 
17
 Coefficients were given equal consideration as z-scores / t-scores in these analyses. A more detailed explanation 
of coefficients and z-scores is included at the beginning of Appendix 3. 
14 
 
association with Negative Cash Flow and the NOI Ratio, suggesting the association with 
the Revenue Ratio served as a confounding variable. 
 Several Regions, Locations, and Construction Types also indicated significant 
associations with both Negative Cash Flow and the NOI Ratio. 
 
Physical Property Condition was the only variable for which longitudinal data
18
 was not 
available. Information on Physical Property Condition was only available for 2007. In order to 
benefit from the richness of the data set the initial models did not include the Physical Property 
Condition variable, but did include all six years of data (2002 – 2007). Analyses were also 
conducted controlling for Physical Property Condition but only evaluating 2007, which yielded 
similar results. Revenue Ratio and Operating Expense Ratio were highly significant just as they 
were in the base models. Regions, Locations, and Construction were still significant to varying 
degrees. Finally, Satisfactory and Poor Conditions showed some association with both Negative 
Cash Flow and NOI Ratio. (Appendix 3, Tables 5 and 6) 
 
2) Revenue Ratio 
Variables most associated with the Revenue Ratio were the Gross Potential Rent Ratio and 
Occupancy. Both variables had strong positive associations with the Revenue Ratio, indicating 
that as they increased the Revenue Ratio would also increase. (Appendix 3, Table 7) This is not 
surprising; LIHTC revenue consists primarily of rental income, calculated as a function of 
occupancy and rents, (which can be derived from Gross Potential Rent). Further analysis 
suggested that controlling for Physical Property Condition might yield fruitful information. 
(Appendix 3, Table 8) 
 
3) Operating Expense Ratio 
Initial analyses of the Operating Expense Ratio were not fruitful. Although a few variables 
indicated significant z-scores, no coefficient exceeded .08. (Appendix 3, Table 9) Controlling for 
Physical Property Condition yielded excellent results, however. Occupancy indicated a strong 
positive association. Satisfactory and Poor Conditions were also associated with the Operating 
Expense Ratio. (Appendix 3, Table 10) 
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Nothing was associated with Occupancy until Physical 
Property Condition was controlled for. Then, Poor Physical 
Condition became highly negatively associated with 
Occupancy. All coefficients were very small but the Revenue 
Ratio, New Construction, and Suburban Locations did have 
significant t values. (Appendix 3, Tables 11 and 12) 
 
5) Gross Potential Rents 
The Operating Expense Ratio and Occupancy were both 
highly positively associated with the Gross Potential Rent 
Ratio. Controlling for Physical Property Condition simply 
moderated these associations. Poor Condition also had a 
fairly strong negative association and relatively large coefficient. (Appendix 3, Tables 13 and 14) 
 
6) Physical Property Condition 
The Operating Expense Ratio and Occupancy were the two variables most strongly associated 
with Physical Property Condition. Properties in Excellent Condition had a negative association 
with the Operating Expense Ratio while those in Satisfactory and Poor Conditions had positive 
associations, indicating that cost overruns are associated with degraded properties. Additionally, 
properties in Excellent and Good Conditions had positive associations with Occupancy, while 
those in Satisfactory and Poor Conditions had negative associations. This indicates that lower 
occupancy tends to be associated with poorer physical property conditions.  (Appendix 3, Tables 
15-18) 
 
7) Hypothesis: The Downward Spiral 
Based on these initial findings a preliminary hypothesis was developed that suggested projects in 
Poor Condition had higher-than-projected expenses for repairs and, concurrently low occupancy 
leading to low revenue. The confluence resulted in poor cash flow performance. It became clear 




















however, that there was far more interplay between factors than such a linear explanation could 
account for.   
 
Interviews with LIHTC practitioners indicated the possibility of a ―downward spiral‖ which 
might explain the interrelated nature of the variables. The model is as follows: (1) A project 
experiences cash flow problems for any number of reasons. (2) To help address the shortfall they 
―skimp‖ on repairs and maintenance. (3) Occupancy and Gross Potential Rent fall as physical 
condition declines. (4) Revenue falls due to lower income from rents. (5) Lower revenue 
exacerbates the cash flow problem, beginning a physical and financial downward spiral for the 
project.  
 
V. Findings from Analyses on the Downward Spiral Model 
 
First, the scope of cash flow problems in Enterprise‘s portfolio was explored. Next the extent to 
which expenses impact cash flow was evaluated, and the possibility that funds intended for 
repairs were used as gap funding was explored. Next, the extent to which low spending for 
repairs and maintenance impacts physical property condition was considered. The question of 
whether physical condition and spending for repairs was associated with occupancy and rent 
levels was then addressed. The impact of occupancy and rents on revenue was evaluated, and 
finally the impact of revenue on cash flow was considered. 
 
1) Scope of Cash Flow Problems 
Bratt et al observed that more than half the 
properties they evaluated experienced cash 
flow problems in any given year. (Bratt, 
Schwartz, Keyes, Stockard, & Vidal, 1998) 
While most issues were short-term and mild 
the magnitude of the problem they observed is 
baffling. Because marginal properties are at 
risk of falling into the spiral it is important to 
know if Enterprise suffers from a similar issue. 
Figure 4: Enterprise Community Investment  
LIHTC Project Cash Flow Performance, 2002-2007 
Ratio of Actual-to-Projected NOI    % of Properties 
Cash Flow Negative 12.7% 
0 - 50% 15.4% 
50 - 75% 17.3% 
75 - 100% 21.4% 
100 - 125% 14.8% 
Greater than 125% 18.3% 




On average, less than 13% of the properties in Enterprise‘s LIHTC portfolio experienced 
negative cash flow between 2002 and 2007, in line with industry averages reported by Ernest and 
Young. (Multi-Housing News, 2004) Approximately 56% of the portfolio had acceptable to 
excellent cash flow performance (NOI Ratio of at least .75). However, one-third of projects had 
NOI Ratios between zero and .75, indicating that cash flow was positive but substantially below 
projections. Many of these properties are not struggling in a way that would attract dramatic 
intervention by most asset managers. Bratt et al reported that even the properties they studied 
that had cash flow problems were generally in very good condition. (Bratt, Schwartz, Keyes, 
Stockard, & Vidal, 1998) However, an ongoing pattern of low NOI Ratios merits attention.  
 
2) Causes of Cost Overruns: Revenue and Expenses 
In the most basic sense poor cash flow is due to low revenue, high expenses, or a combination 
thereof, following the accounting principle that Revenue – Expenses = NOI. (Geltner, Miller, 
Eichholtz, & Clayton, 2006) Exploratory research supported that principle among the sample 
population. Both the Revenue Ratio and Operating Expense Ratio are strongly associated with 
cash flow. (Appendix 3, Tables 1-4) Cost overruns present a greater challenge than revenue 
shortfalls in Enterprise‘s portfolio although a combination of the two issues was most often the 
culprit. Half of projects with an NOI Ratio less than one had both Revenue and Expense Ratios 
less than one. 12% had a Revenue Ratio less than one but a good Operating Expense Ratio, and 
38% had an Operating Expense Ratio greater than one but a high Revenue Ratio. 
 
3) Association Between Line Item Expenses and NOI Ratio: Are Repairs Funds Used to 
Meet Shortfalls? 
While the association between the Operating Expense Ratio and cash flow was clear the 
individual line items which make up Operating Expenses were more varied. Most line items 
remained relatively stable as the NOI Ratio varied, although administrative costs and utilities 
decreased as the NOI Ratio increased. (Figure 5) It is not surprising that the Administrative 
Expense Ratio was highest for troubled projects, which likely have complex efforts surrounding 
workouts or other remedies. Some of the site‘s problems may have stemmed from 
underestimating administrative needs in the first place. The fact that the Utilities Ratio was 
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highest among the most troubled 
properties and then stabilized may 
indicate that utility cost 
fluctuations helped drive cash 
flow problems or that utilities 
were a bell-weather issue for poor 
budgeting. The other expense 
ratios were fairly stable because 
they are fixed costs or were 
calculated based on project 
performance.  
 
The Repairs Ratio, which was the 
most highly associated with cash 
flow, performed differently than 
the other expenses.  It was very 
high for projects with the worst 
NOI Ratios, but declined steeply 
for marginal projects – those with 
NOIs approximately between zero 
and two – before rising again. 
(Figure 6) The drop in spending 
among marginal projects, 
unmatched among other line items, supports the assertion that sites may call upon their repairs 
and maintenance line items to shore up troubled budgets. Additional research on this front would 
be useful, but supporting assertion from practitioners (Tatum 2009; Martin 2009) and other 
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Figure 6: Repairs by NOI Ratio
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4) Impact of Spending for Repairs on Physical Property Condition 
A core assertion present in the 
interviews and literature was that 
failing to conduct routine 
preventative maintenance of a 
property would have a damaging 
effect on its condition. (Bratt et al, 
1998; Martin, 2009; Tatum, 2009)  
Identifying an association between 
the Repairs Ratio and Physical 
Property Condition would support 
that assertion.  
 
Analyses clearly showed an 
association between lower a 
Repairs Ratios and Poor 
Condition. (Appendix 3, Table 
19). As the Repairs Ratio 
decreased the likelihood a 
property was in Poor Condition 
increased. Significant associations 
were not present for other property 
conditions. Furthermore, the mean 
Repair Ratio for properties in Poor 
Condition was just 1.456, 
compared to 1.836 for those in Satisfactory Condition and 1.508 for those in excellent condition. 
Properties in Excellent Condition had the lowest Repairs Ratio, at 1.3601, likely because they 
did not need substantial repairs. (Figures 7 and 8)  
 
Because data regarding Property Condition was only available for 2007 it is difficult to track 
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Figure 8: Repairs Ratio by Property Condition
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However, a trend in spending is clear. The mean Repairs Ratio fluctuated from year to year but 
its general trend was it to increase or stay constant between 2002 and 2007 among most types of 
properties. However, it displayed a steady downward trend in properties that were in Poor 
Condition in 2007. While this is not conclusive evidence that the properties were degrading it 
does indicate that a long-term pattern of neglect is present in the worst properties. 
 
5) Impact of Physical Property Condition on Occupancy and Gross Potential Rent 
A) Occupancy 
Exploratory research identified a strong association between Occupancy and Physical Property 
Condition, particularly Poor Condition. (Appendix 3, Tables 12 and 15-18) Mean Occupancy 
was highest in properties in Excellent Condition (97%), decreased slightly in Good and 
Satisfactory Conditions (95% and 93%) and dropped precipitously among properties in Poor 
Condition (85%). Physical Property Condition also appeared to be an important control variable 
for Occupancy, particularly as relates to the Operating Expense Ratio. Because longitudinal data 
was available for Occupancy but not Physical Property Condition it was difficult to associate 
changes in Occupancy with changes in Physical Property Condition. The Repairs Ratio was used 
as a proxy for that purpose.  
 
There is a strong positive association between the Repairs Ratio and Occupancy: as the Repairs 
Ratio increases, Occupancy likewise increases. (Appendix 3, Table 20) Among most types of 
properties sampled, spending for 
repairs had little impact on 
Occupancy and sometimes even 
corresponded with lower 
Occupancy levels. It is not 
difficult to imagine that a long-
term, large-scale project in an 
otherwise high-quality building 
could be unpleasant for residents. 
Among properties in Poor 




















Figure 9: Occupancy by Repairs Ratio
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the Repairs Ratio was associated with an increase in Occupancy, potentially by people attracted 
to improving conditions or reduced tenant losses. (Figure 9) 
 
B) Gross Potential Rent Ratio 
An association between Property Condition and the Gross Potential Rent Ratio would indicate 
that the physical upkeep of a building is associated with the rent rates that can be charged, as 
Martin asserts.  
 
The Repairs Ratio was again used as a substitute for longitudinal data about property conditions, 
and the results were no less conclusive. A comparison of mean Gross Potential Rent Ratios left 
no doubt that Physical Property Condition impacts the rents a property can charge. The Gross 
Potential Rent Ratio was 1.00 for properties in Excellent and Good Conditions and 1.05 for 
Satisfactory Conditions, but plummeted to .89 for those in Poor Conditions. Regressions also 
indicated a fairly strong negative association between the Gross Potential Rent Ratio and Poor 
Condition, indicating that properties in Poor Condition are likely to have lower-than-projected 
gross potential rents. (Appendix 3, Table 14)  
 
There is an extremely strong positive association between the Repairs Ratio and Gross Potential 
Rent Ratio, indicating that increases in repairs and maintenance spending is associated with 
increases in Gross Potential Rent.  Among properties in Excellent and Good Conditions, once 
spending reaches a threshold of 
approximately one the relationship 
between the Repairs Ratio and 
Gross Potential Rent Ratio 
stabilizes. Properties in 
Satisfactory and Poor Conditions 
continue to experience higher 
Gross Potential Rent Ratios as 
their Repairs Ratio improves, 
potentially suggesting that 



























Figure 10: Gross Potential Rents by Repairs Ratio
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rents at even the worst properties. (Figure 10) 
 
6) Impact of Occupancy and Gross Potential Rent Ratio  on Revenue Ratio 
The association between 
Occupancy and Revenue Ratio, 
and the association between Gross 
Potential Rent Ratio and Revenue 
Ratio seems obvious. This sample 
excludes projects with commercial 
units so all revenue will flow from 
rents or ancillary services such as 
parking and laundry. Those 
ancillary services contribute a 
negligible amount to projects in 
Enterprise‘s portfolio: an average 
of 0.33% of total revenue. 
Therefore, revenue comes almost 
exclusively from rent, calculated 
as Rents Charged x Occupancy. 
Rents charged can be inferred 
from gross potential rent. 
 
Statistical analysis supported 
logic. Occupancy and the Gross 
Potential Rent Ratio were both 
highly associated with the 
Revenue Ratio. (Appendix 3, 
Tables 7 and 8) The correlation held true across Physical Property Conditions. Although Poor 
Condition had the lowest Occupancy and Gross Potential Rent Ratio, the association with 












































































Figure 13: Revenue by NOI Ratio
12) The implications are clear. The way a property was maintained impacted its rents and 
occupancy, which, in turn, impacted its revenue. 
 
7) Revenue Ratio‘s Impact on Cash Flow 
For the downward spiral to last 
more than one revolution the poor 
revenue described above must 
impact future cash flow. In 
Section V-2, revenue was 
identified one of the two main 
factors impacting NOI. Sixty-two 
percent of projects with cash flow 
problems had Revenue Ratios 
below one, and the statistical 
association was overwhelming. 
(Appendix 3, Tables 1 – 4) The association between the Revenue Ratio and NOI Ratio holds 
constant regardless of Physical Property Condition. Even in properties in Excellent Condition a 
poor Revenue Ratio will impact NOI. (Figure 13) 
 
VI. Additional Comments on Findings 
 
Several other variables 
indicated significant 
association with cash flow 
issues. While not directly 
related to the core research, 
these factors should be 
acknowledged in order to 
better identify and mitigate 




























Urban Locations were far more 
likely than suburban or rural 
projects to suffer from poor cash 
flow (NOI Ratio less than .75). 
Forty-three percent of urban 
projects suffered from poor cash 
flow while just 22% of Suburban 
Locations had the same problem. 
(Figure 14)  
 
 As expected, financial problems 
co-occurred with physical 
problems. Twenty-four percent of 
Urban Location properties were in 
Poor or Satisfactory Condition 
compared with 12% of Suburban 
and 13% of Rural Location 
properties. (Figure 15) 
 
Rehabilitated sites also struggled. 
Both Moderate and Substantial 
Rehabilitations experienced cash 
flow underperformance of 42 – 
43%, while New Construction 
only experienced difficulties 36% 
of the time. (Figure 14) As with 
Location, financial difficulties co-occurred with physical difficulties. Moderate Rehabilitations 
were in less than Good Condition 39% of the time, and Substantially Rehabilitated properties 
were in Poor or Satisfactory conditions 26% of the time, compared to just 13% of new 
construction properties. (Figure 16) 
Poor Satisfactory Good Excellent
Urban 3% 21% 58% 18%
Suburban 3% 9% 45% 43%









Figure 15: Physical Condition by Location
Poor Satisfactory Good Excellent
Mixed 3% 17% 62% 19%
Moderate Rehab 9% 30% 52% 9%
Substantial Rehab 4% 22% 62% 12%









Figure 16: Physical Condition by Construction Type
Poor Satisfactory Good Excellent
MidAtlantic 1% 19% 54% 26%
Central 1% 13% 50% 36%
Northeast 6% 14% 59% 21%













Finally, although most Regions performed similarly, the Mid-Atlantic Region was more likely to 
experience cash flow problems (44% versus 36-37% in other locations). (Table 14) This did not 
translate into Physical Property Condition issues. However, the Central Region was somewhat 
more likely to have properties in Good and Excellent Conditions than other regions (86% versus 
78-80% in other regions). (Figure 17) 
 
VII. Discussion  
 
There is no question the LIHTC industry has a cash flow problem. Forty-five percent of 
Enterprise‘s portfolio performed below expectations between 2002 and 2007, on par with or even 
somewhat better than the industry. (Abravanel & Johnson, 1999) (Bratt, Schwartz, Keyes, 
Stockard, & Vidal, 1998) Because LIHTC investors do not receive their returns from cash flows 
there was less concern about underperforming properties than there should have been. 2004 
reports that incidences of negative cash flow were increasing did ring alarm-bells because 
negative cash flow can lead to insolvency and loss of credits. (Multi-Housing News, 2004) 
Negative cash flow doesn‘t simply appear, however. In Enterprise‘s portfolio, 60-70% of 
underperforming properties in any given year had poor cash flow the previous year and between 
68% and 84% (depending on the year) of cash-flow negative properties performed poorly the 
previous year. 
 
Demanding properties operate within a market context without adequately providing for the 
implications thereof is arguably at the root of the downward spiral identified in this report. All 
specific issues discussed are manifestations. Those manifestations are important to understand 
because they are what can be immediately addressed – what must be immediately addressed. 
However, without considering the root problem any solution will simply be a stop-gap measure. 
 
It is, however, critical to address those manifestations. This report has discussed how poor 
strategies to manage cash shortfalls exacerbate the problem. The remainder will highlight (1) 
certain aspects of the underwriting budget that seem to be most associated with initial shortfalls, 
(2) discuss the POAH model which incorporates several good strategies, (3) reiterate the 
26 
 
importance of maintenance and repairs as a means of maintaining occupancy and gross potential 
rents, and (4) suggest a proactive approach to physical upkeep. 
 
 
1) Underwriting for Sufficient Operating Budgets 
One of the most commonly cited 
concerns about LIHTC is the 
extent to which projects operated 
on extraordinarily thin budgets. 
―LIHTC projects often are tightly 
run with operating revenues often 
just covering operating 
expenses… Despite incentives to 
keep net income close to zero, no 
project can continue indefinitely with expenses exceeding revenues.‖ (Cummings & DiPasquale, 
1998) The problem was not absent from Enterprise‘s portfolio; 88% of projects with cash flow 
problems experienced cost overruns. Administrative, repairs, and insurance were the three line 
items which most commonly exceeded their budget.  (Figure 18) Per the previous discussion of 
LIHTC‘s complexities, underwriters may wish to reevaluate administrative needs with their 
sponsors. For example, Winn Residential now only hires property managers with four-year 
degrees because they feel the complexity of the program demands people ―be at a level that‘s 
much higher professionally than 20 years ago. As a result [they]‘re paying a lot more money that 
[they] used to.‖ (Martin M. , 2009) Appropriate trending of revenue and expense inflators was 
another commonly cited underwriting concern. (Tatum, 2009) 
 
The last common underwriting complaint was over-leverage. Underwriting for a 1.0 debt DCR is 
not unusual. (Stegman, 1999) In Enterprise‘s portfolio, 62% of sample projects had must-pay 
debt service at some point in the study period. Of those, 76% had a DCR less than one. 
Addressing over-leverage at a time when credit prices are low and soft debt is scarce will be 
challenging but it is important to think about when considering overly-thin budgets. 
 








Admin Utilities Repairs Taxes Insurance Mgmt 
Fees
Figure 18: Projects with Line Item Ratios Exceeding 1.25
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2) Preservation of Affordable Housing‘s (POAH) Model 
POAH has adopted a model that, 
taken as a whole, is not feasible 
for most sites. Its composite 
pieces offer useful guidance, 
however. ―One thing that we do 
that is very rare,‖ said Executive 
Director Amy Anthony ―is we 
underwrite for cash flow. Our 
business plan is premised on cash 
flow supporting the organization… I do think the ability to manage the ups and downs that 
inevitably happen is critically linked to having a little bit more cushion when you start... If you 
can support yourself on your cash flow you‘re just a lot more stable.‖ (Anthony, 2009) 
 
POAH focuses on acquisition and rehabilitation of occupied Section 8 and 236 properties, which 
garner greater rental revenue. The parent organization is able to offer soft debt as gap financing 
to individual properties as needed. (Anthony, 2009) While the lessons of underwriting for cash 
flow, seeking means of bolstering rental revenue, and maximizing soft debt are broadly 
applicable, the full model is, of course, less so. In the words of Ann Houston, Executive Director 
of Chelsea Neighborhood Housing Services ―Amy is brilliant and savvy, but her model works 
because she can cherry-pick Section 8s and she has so much money she can do everything in-
house. The rest of us have to do our best with the available gap financing.‖ (Houston, 2009) 
 
3) Importance of Physical Property Condition 
The most important implication of LIHTC being a market-based program is that the product 
must appeal to and compete with the market. When they first reach qualified occupancy, many 
LIHTC sites are on par with or in better shape than the surrounding market. New construction in 
particular tends to be high quality and fare well. (McAdie, 2009) Moderate and substantial 
rehabilitation projects are far more likely to experience problems earlier either because they 
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As discussed in Section V.5, the amount invested in repairs and maintenance has a strong 
association with both Occupancy and the Gross Potential Rent Ratio. As spending falls, 
Occupancy falls, as does Gross Potential Rent Ratio, presumably as an attempt to raise 
Occupancy. Furthermore, Occupancy and Gross Potential Rent Ratio are both dramatically lower 
in properties in Poor Condition (Figures 19). It is thus fair to say that a lack of maintenance has a 
negative impact on property condition, which in turn impacts rents and occupancy. Since 62% of 
projects with poor cash flow experienced poor revenue, addressing poor occupancy and rents 
should be an important goal. 
 
4) A Proactive Approach 
Finding money for upkeep may seem daunting particularly in the current financial situation, but 
in a market-driven program it is critical. A few factors to consider are making certain the 
underwriting budget is sufficient, prioritizing what needs to be done to professional quality 
versus what can be done by maintenance crews (e.g. professionals should paint marketing fronts 
but not back hallways) and making certain there are sufficient provisions for systems 
replacements, particularly in rehabilitated properties. (Tatum, 2009) Asset Manager Len Tatum 
advocates a proactive approach to stewardship. For example, reserves could be invested to 
upgrade systems or marketing fronts before it becomes absolutely necessary. In this way, 




This is a difficult time for the LIHTC program. While every practitioner interviewed believed it 
would survive, all believed there would be some change to its structure or magnitude. If it is to 
remain the force it has been for the past two decades, it is necessary to reevaluate the way deals 
are structured and recognize the fact that it is no longer to subject projects to market pressures 
without providing them with appropriate tools.
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APPENDIX 1: Enterprise Community Investment Profile 
Enterprise Community Investment, Inc. 
Enterprise Community Investment, Inc. is a leading real estate investment services company for 
affordable housing and community development. We provide partners with development capital 
via equity and debt products, and expertise in community development practices. Enterprise is 
the industry leader in green affordable housing. In partnership with investors and developers 
nationwide, we currently invest in communities at a rate of $1 billion a year. Our strategic 
priorities address critical housing needs. 
 
History 
In 1982, Jim and Patty Rouse founded Enterprise Community Partners, Inc. (then named The 
Enterprise Foundation), with this mission: to see that all low-income people in the United States 
have the opportunity for fit and affordable housing and to move up and out of poverty into the 
mainstream of American life.  
 
On March 7, 1984, Rouse, the renowned master developer and champion for affordable housing, 
formed the financing arm of Enterprise now known as Enterprise Community Investment, Inc. 
(then named The Enterprise Social Investment Corporation, or ESIC), a socially motivated for-
profit company. The financing arm‘s primary purpose was to fund Enterprise‘s affordable 
housing initiatives through the syndication of tax shelter benefits to for-profit corporations, a 
process Rouse pioneered based on his belief in the power of private initiative and the free 
enterprise system to promote social good. 
 
However, in 1986 Congress began to overhaul the tax code, and this tax benefit was one of the 
first it proposed to eliminate. In response, Enterprise successfully led the charge to create an 
even more attractive vehicle to encourage the private investment of capital for the development 
and rehabilitation of affordable housing. As a result, a clause was included in the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986 that created the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program—a dollar-for-
dollar tax credit for affordable housing investments. 
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To launch the program, Enterprise solicited corporations to invest in a $50 million account to 
take advantage of the new tax credits. In January 1987, Fannie Mae became the first to do so, 
and in May of that year, Fannie Mae and Enterprise announced that work had begun on the first 
LIHTC funded affordable housing project in the country—the transformation of a downtown 
Pittsburgh YMCA into a shelter for the homeless called Wood Street Commons. The 16-story 
facility for temporary and permanent housing included 270 single-room occupancy beds that 
would rent for between $75 and $150 a month. The project was, according to Rouse, ―an 
outstanding example of how a public-private partnership can work to provide housing for the less 
fortunate.‖ 
 
The LIHTC program accounts for nearly 90 percent of the nation‘s affordable housing created 
today.  
 
Over the past 25 years, Enterprise‘s commitment to our mission has developed into a 
comprehensive array of financing tools to support community transformation. Pre-development 
lending, permanent financing, grants, tax credit equity, as well as development expertise result in 
quality, affordable housing, mixed-use development, office and commercial real estate projects, 
and preservation projects. Currently, Enterprise is investing in communities at a rate of $1 billion 
a year. 
 
Enterprise‘s LIHTC Program 
The Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) is a 20-year old federal program that accounts for 
nearly 90 percent of all affordable rental housing created in the United States today. The LIHTC 
program has been instrumental in meeting the country‘s critical affordable housing shortage by 
stimulating the production or rehabilitation of nearly 2 million affordable rental homes. 
Enterprise helped write the legislation that created the tax credit program, and is among the 
leading syndicators of LIHTC equity. 
 
 Raised over $7.2 billion in Low Income Housing Tax Credit equity through more than 95 
investment funds 
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 Financed over 1,600 LIHTC properties totaling more than 93,000 affordable housing units under 
asset management 
 
We continue to find and structure projects that both meet the company‘s mission and prudent 
underwriting standards. In 2007, of the 96 projects that our Investment Committee approved: 
 Approximately 46 percent of all deals had no conventional debt 
 Another 27 percent included green features  
 Nearly 50 percent of all deals reached people earning less than 30 percent of the area median 
income (AMI) (Enterprise Community Investment, Inc, 2008) 
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APPENDIX 2: Biographies of Interviewees 
 
Amy S. Anthony, Executive Director, Preservation of Affordable Housing 
 
Amy S. Anthony is President, founder and Executive Director of POAH. One of the nation‘s 
foremost experts in housing finance and policy, she has been active in the industry for more than 
30 years. Ms. Anthony also founded and serves as President of Housing Investments, Inc., a 
Boston- based consulting firm which focuses on preserving existing assisted housing around the 
country. From 1983 to 1990, Ms. Anthony served as Secretary of the Massachusetts Executive 
Office of Communities and Development, a $600 million Cabinet-level state agency devoted to 
producing affordable housing and promoting municipal, community, and economic development. 
 
Under her direction, Massachusetts created and implemented innumerable innovative, award-
winning programs that produced more than 25,000 homes and have served for decades as models 
for other states. Ms. Anthony has also played an active role in the development of national 
housing policy over many years. In 1987, she was named to the National Housing Task Force, 
the recommendations of which evolved into landmark housing legislation, including the HOME 
Program. 
 
She served as President of the Council of State Community Affairs Agencies from 1987 to 1990 
and as part of President-elect Clinton‘s HUD Transition Team in 1992. Ms. Anthony was a 
founding member of the Multifamily Housing Institute and has also served on Fannie Mae‘s 
Housing Impact Advisory Council, the Freddie Mac Affordable Housing Advisory Committee 
and the Boards of the National Equity Fund, the Metropolitan Boston Housing Partnership, and 
the Women‘s Institute for Housing and Economic Development. A current member of the 
Boards of Directors of Homes for America and the Citizens Housing and Planning Association 
(CHAPA), she is a graduate of Smith College.  
 
Preservation of Affordable Housing 
POAH‘s primary mission is to purchase large, multi-family properties and refinance them for 
long-term affordability. POAH has already rescued and refinanced more than 4,900 units of 
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affordable rental housing in eight states and the District of Columbia. 
 
Between 1965 and 1990, $60 billion in federal funding was invested in privately-owned, 
affordable rental homes for families, the disabled and the elderly.  These homes were built in big 
cities, small towns and rural areas across the country. They were multi-story high-rises and 
single family bungalows. But all were built according to the same premise: that the government 
would provide funds to underwrite construction and operating costs, and in return, owners would 
promise that rents would be affordable to low income families and seniors on fixed incomes for 
the duration of the fixed financing period. Now more than four decades have passed, and the 
financial notes which built this housing are reaching ―paid in full‖ status.  With the expiration of 
each financing agreement, the leverage for keeping rents affordable is lost. 
 
POAH seeks to intervene and forestall such losses, preserving this valuable and fragile asset for 
future generations. POAH also uses its preservation transactions to demonstrate how creative 
thinking and innovative financing can combine for the best outcomes. To the professionals at 
POAH, a deal is not just a deal.  Navigating the complicated and highly regulated world of 
affordable housing finance is POAH‘s proven route toward the goal of preserving and protecting 




Michael Martin, Senior Vice President, Winn Residential 
Michael R. Martin, Senior Vice President, has been in the property management business for 25 
years.  As Senior Vice President of WinnResidential, he is responsible for ongoing property 
management operations for more than 9,000 apartments as well as coordinating management and 
development opportunities with WinnDevelopment.  Mr. Martin has extensive experience with 
conventionally financed, mixed income and assisted family and elderly apartment communities 
in suburban and inner city settings.  Additional experience includes working with public housing 
authorities, state housing finance agencies, the United States Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, third party property owners and a variety of non-profit and resident controlled 
housing development entities.  Mr. Martin is directly responsible for all aspects of property 
Appendix 2: Biographies of Interviewees 
34 
 
management oversight including agency reporting, profit and loss, budgeting, personnel, 
training, maintenance/capital planning, administrative procedures and compliance.  Prior to 
returning to the Winn companies in 2002, Mr. Martin was Senior Vice President of Gatehouse 
Management, Inc.  In this position his responsibilities included direct operating control of 
Gatehouse Management and management oversight of the design, development, leasing and 
operation of newly constructed LIHTC communities in Florida, California, Rhode Island and 




Headquartered in Boston's Historic Faneuil Hall, WinnCompanies develops, acquires and 
manages multi-family and mixed income properties throughout the United States. Since 1971, 
WinnDevelopment has acquired and developed real estate holdings valued in excess of $1.5 
billion. WinnCommercial is involved in the development and management of office, retail, 
parking, hotel, marina and mixed-use properties throughout New England. WinnResidential's 
multi-family management portfolio includes over 70,000 residences across the country. As 
diverse as WinnCompanies holdings may be, our 2,000 employees are united by a commitment 
to excellence and a common set of principles upon which the organization was founded more 
than 35 years ago.  
 
WinnResidential 
WinnResidential employees are driven by a single goal; to significantly raise the standards of 
residential property management - one interaction at a time. A company of problem solvers, 
WinnResidential constantly works at creating innovative solutions. Whether it‘s crafting a 
successful marketing campaign to raise the profile of a property in a competitive market or 
creating on-site daycare to provide better opportunities for residents in privatized public housing, 
WinnResidential has earned a national reputation for creating "Communities of Quality" with a 
combination of fresh thinking and hard work. (Winn Companies) 
 
Geoffrey MacAdie, Director of Portfolio Management, Massachusetts Housing Partnership 
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Geoff MacAdie has more than 20 years' experience in real estate and affordable housing. He 
joined MHP's staff in 1998 and was named Director of Portfolio Management in 2004. He had 
previously managed a large affordable housing portfolio in Maine for the Insignia Residential 
Group and worked as an asset manager for residential properties at Fleet/Recoll. He has also 
managed his own real estate management consulting firm. Geoff has an MS in Urban 
Affairs/City Planning from Boston University and a bachelor's degree in urban affairs from the 
University of Connecticut. (Massachusetts Housing Partnership) 
 
Massachusetts Housing Partnership 
The Massachusetts Housing Partnership (MHP) is a statewide public non-profit affordable 
housing organization that works in concert with the Governor and the state Department of 
Housing and Community Development to help increase the supply of affordable housing in 
Massachusetts. 
 
MHP was established in 1985 to increase the state's overall rate of housing production and find 
creative new solutions to address the need for affordable housing. In 1990, the state legislature 
took that premise to heart, becoming the first and only state in the nation to pass an interstate 
banking act that requires companies that acquire Massachusetts banks to make funds available to 




Len Tatum, Real Estate Policy and Asset Management Consultant 
 
Len is a real estate asset management and policy consultant and practitioner for nonprofit 
developers and property management operations across the country.  He has spent more than 25 
years in the field of real estate and investments.  His current focus is with ―property 
repositioning‖ and maximizing portfolio performance through service delivery improvements, 
capital planning, green and sustainable design, innovative marketing and debt restructuring.   Len 
is also active coaching groups to prepare and execute tax exit strategies for tax credit financed 
properties. 




Prior to being a consultant, Mr. Tatem was the Director of Finance for Harvard University‘s Real 
Estate Corporation.  This $500 million (1995 dollars) non-academic portfolio included market 
rate, rent control and subsidized housing, hotels, warehouse and retail space and office buildings.  
He also was responsible for the negotiation of more than $40 million worth of service contracts 
annually in support of both its non-profit and for profit management companies.  In addition, Len 
supported the organization‘s development and construction management department by 
conducting marketing and feasibility studies.  He was also involved with securing 501c3 bond 
financing in support of construction projects at Harvard University and Boston College. 
 
Len‘s business relationships include both large and small, active community development 
corporations and various sized non-profits interested in building, preserving and managing 
affordable housing and smart growth oriented properties.  He concentrates in creating 
organizational capacity through one-on-one mentoring as well as providing lectures and training 
on a variety of topics.   Len has contributed case studies to the Consortium for Housing and 
Asset Management‘s (CHAM) Advanced Asset Management and has assisted in the 
development of their curriculum.  He is also a frequent speaker, trainer and presenter for many 
organizations including the New Hampshire Housing, Georgia State Trade Association for 
Nonprofit Developers (GSTAND), The State of Washington, Stewards of Affordable Housing 
for the Future (SAHF), LISC, Enterprise Community Partners and NeighborWorks® America.  
He has been the architect of asset plans to restructure and reposition properties and portfolios in 
various areas of the United States.   
 
In addition to having a Master‘s Degree concentrating in Administration, Planning and Social 
Policy from Harvard University, Mr. Tatem has a Bachelor of Science concentrating in Finance 
from the University of Rhode Island.  He has received certifications as a National Compliance 
Specialist (NCP®) and CHAM‘s Non-Profit Housing Management Specialist (NHMS®).  
(Tatum L. , 2008) 
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APPENDIX 3: Regression Tables 
 
NB: Equal consideration was given to coefficients and z / t-scores in most instances. In very 
general terms, the coefficient is a prediction about the magnitude and direction of the 
relationship between the independent and dependent variable. The standard error measures the 
accuracy of that prediction, and the z-score (or t-score) is the coefficient / standard error. A z-
score greater than or equal to the absolute value of 1.98 indicates the relationship between the 
variables can be confirmed with 95% certainty. 
 
A common shortcut is to consider only the z-score (or t-score). This approach has not been used 
here because a very small coefficient with a very small error could yield a large z-score. This 
only confirms that some relationship is certain, not that it is an important relationship. By 
considering both the significance of the z-score and the magnitude of the coefficient the problem 
is easily avoided. 
  
Appendix 3: Regression Tables 
38 
 
TABLE 1: Negative Cash Flow Logistic Regression 
Random Effects Logistic Regression Number of observations 1940 
Group Variable: (i): Project_ID Number of groups 875 
Random Effects u_i ~ Gaussian Observations per group: min 1 
 
Average: 2.2 
Log likelihood -706.92529 
 
Max: 6 
Prob > chi2 0 
 
Wald chi2(20) 330.38 
Negative Cash Flow Coefficient Standard Error z P>z 95% Confidence Interval 
Revenue Ratio -16.4414 1.560384 -10.54 0 -19.4997 -13.3831 
Operating Expense Ratio 8.905952 0.565224 15.76 0 7.798133 10.01377 
Gross Potential Rent Ratio 1.583774 1.509069 1.05 0.294 -1.37395 4.541495 
Vacancies / Concessions  
Ratio 0.300587 0.115694 2.6 0.009 0.073831 0.527343 
Occupancy 0.107884 1.360273 0.08 0.937 -2.5582 2.773971 
Age -5.5E-05 0.000101 -0.54 0.589 -0.00025 0.000144 
Family 0.96978 0.692121 1.4 0.161 -0.38675 2.326313 
Senior 0.067656 0.71448 0.09 0.925 -1.3327 1.46801 
Native American 0.841819 1.257046 0.67 0.503 -1.62195 3.305584 
Special Needs 0.080762 0.294922 0.27 0.784 -0.49727 0.658798 
SRO 0.141639 0.652761 0.22 0.828 -1.13775 1.421027 
Support Services 0.562115 0.256449 2.19 0.028 0.059485 1.064745 
Region Northeast -0.2098 0.406201 -0.52 0.606 -1.00594 0.586343 
Region Mid-Atlantic 1.347742 0.330072 4.08 0 0.700813 1.994671 
Region Central 1.419147 0.346329 4.1 0 0.740354 2.09794 
Region West Dropped because of collinearity. Strong positive association.  
Construction New Dropped because of collinearity. Strong positive association.  
Construction  
Moderate Rehab 0.493779 0.348576 1.42 0.157 -0.18942 1.176975 
Construction 
Substantial Rehab 1.053432 0.292979 3.6 0 0.479204 1.627661 
Construction Mixed 0.779389 0.524468 1.49 0.137 -0.24855 1.807328 
Location Suburban Dropped because of collinearity. Small positive association.  
Location Urban 0.593689 0.357132 1.66 0.096 -0.10628 1.293655 
Location Rural 1.600417 0.424942 3.77 0 0.767547 2.433287 
_cons -4.28915 3.422628 -1.25 0.21 -10.9974 2.419075 
 /lnsig2u 1.113288 0.133162 0.852295 1.374281 
 sigma_u 1.744807 0.116171 1.531346 1.988023 
 Rho 0.48062 0.033241 0.416161 0.54573 
 Likelihood ratio test of rho=0: chibar2(01) 90.9 
 
Prob >= chibar2 = 0.000 
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TABLE 2: Negative Cash Flow Logistic Regression with Line Item Expenses 
Random Effects Logistic Regression Number of observations 1223 
Group Variable: (i): Project_ID Number of groups 561 
Random Effects u_i ~ Gaussian Observations per group: min 1 
 
Average: 2.2 
Log likelihood -503.03064 
 
Max: 6 
Prob > chi2 0 
 
Wald chi2(20) 184.24 
Negative Cash Flow Coefficient Standard Error z P>z 95% Confidence Interval 
Revenue Ratio -12.3138 1.856166 -6.63 0 -15.9518 -8.6758 
Administrative Ratio 0.04923 0.017473 2.82 0.005 0.014984 0.083475 
Utilities Ratio 0.515147 0.136052 3.79 0 0.248491 0.781803 
Repairs Ratio 1.100868 0.1584 6.95 0 0.79041 1.411325 
Taxes Ratio 0.305394 0.081322 3.76 0 0.146007 0.464781 
Insurance Ratio 0.286614 0.122418 2.34 0.019 0.046678 0.52655 
Management Fee Ratio 0.597628 0.354815 1.68 0.092 -0.0978 1.293052 
Other Expenses Ratio 0.035275 0.021034 1.68 0.094 -0.00595 0.076501 
Gross Potential Rent Ratio 4.069339 1.938995 2.1 0.036 0.26898 7.869699 
Vacancies / Concessions  
Ratio 0.455282 0.151239 3.01 0.003 0.158859 0.751706 
Occupancy -0.73292 1.568703 -0.47 0.64 -3.80752 2.341684 
Age -5.6E-05 0.000137 -0.41 0.685 -0.00032 0.000213 
Family 1.379373 1.055146 1.31 0.191 -0.68868 3.447421 
Senior 0.375436 1.103125 0.34 0.734 -1.78665 2.537521 
Native American -1.11397 2.361125 -0.47 0.637 -5.74169 3.513747 
Special Needs -0.00574 0.378002 -0.02 0.988 -0.74661 0.73513 
SRO 0.602227 0.987034 0.61 0.542 -1.33232 2.536778 
Support Services 0.509493 0.31722 1.61 0.108 -0.11225 1.131232 
Region Northeast -0.77962 0.50488 -1.54 0.123 -1.76916 0.20993 
Region Mid-Atlantic 1.021437 0.342209 2.98 0.003 0.35072 1.692154 
Region Central 1.535173 0.492011 3.12 0.002 0.57085 2.499496 
Region West Dropped because of collinearity. Strong positive association.  
Construction New Dropped because of collinearity. Strong positive association.  
Construction  
Moderate Rehab -0.03831 0.432835 -0.09 0.929 -0.88665 0.810034 
Construction 
Substantial Rehab 1.025847 0.355764 2.88 0.004 0.328563 1.723131 
Construction Mixed 0.39474 0.60834 0.65 0.516 -0.79758 1.587064 
Location Suburban Dropped because of collinearity. Small positive association.  
Location Urban 1.113992 0.443089 2.51 0.012 0.245554 1.982431 
Location Rural 1.88782 0.504903 3.74 0 0.89823 2.877411 
_cons -2.5064 4.930145 -0.51 0.611 -12.1693 7.15651 
 /lnsig2u 1.139954 0.15696 0.832318 1.44759 
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sigma_u 1.768226 0.13877 1.516127 2.062244 
 Rho 0.487279 0.039215 0.411316 0.563835 
 Likelihood ratio test of rho=0: chibar2(01) 72.76 
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TABLE 3: NOI Ratio GLS Regression 
Random Effects GLS Regression Number of observations 2961 
Group Variable: (i): Project_ID Number of groups 888 
R-squared within 0.1122 Observations per group: min 1 
Between 0.0607 Average 3.3 
Overall 0.0762 Max 6 
Random Effects u_i ~ Gaussian Wald chi2(20) 316.6 
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed) Prob > chi2 0 
NOI Ratio Coefficient Standard Error z P>z 95% Confidence Interval 
Revenue Ratio 5.024227 0.352502 14.25 0 4.333336 5.715118 
Operating Expense Ratio -1.95515 0.193627 -10.1 0 -2.33465 -1.57565 
Gross Potential Rent Ratio -1.28896 0.486666 -2.65 0.008 -2.24281 -0.33511 
Vacancies / Concessions  
Ratio -0.0077 0.049522 -0.16 0.876 -0.10476 0.089365 
Occupancy -0.82239 0.700229 -1.17 0.24 -2.19481 0.550035 
Age 2.53E-05 0.000126 0.2 0.841 -0.00022 0.000273 
Family 0.791678 1.098483 0.72 0.471 -1.36131 2.944664 
Senior 0.753644 1.121778 0.67 0.502 -1.445 2.952289 
Native American -0.30921 1.278116 -0.24 0.809 -2.81428 2.195849 
Special Needs 0.418586 0.421639 0.99 0.321 -0.40781 1.244982 
SRO -0.64302 1.026602 -0.63 0.531 -2.65512 1.369084 
Support Services -0.46599 0.38311 -1.22 0.224 -1.21687 0.284888 
Region Northeast 0.287036 0.494567 0.58 0.562 -0.6823 1.256369 
Region Mid-Atlantic -0.29073 0.435664 -0.67 0.505 -1.14461 0.563157 
Region Central -0.11859 0.536009 -0.22 0.825 -1.16915 0.931965 
Region West Dropped because of collinearity. Strong positive association.  
Construction New Dropped because of collinearity. Strong positive association.  
Construction  
Moderate Rehab 0.039308 0.531341 0.07 0.941 -1.0021 1.080718 
Construction 
Substantial Rehab -0.16277 0.448004 -0.36 0.716 -1.04084 0.715305 
Construction Mixed -0.02718 0.845275 -0.03 0.974 -1.68389 1.629528 
Location Suburban Dropped because of collinearity. Small positive association.  
Location Urban -0.15244 0.491956 -0.31 0.757 -1.11666 0.811773 
Location Rural -0.20819 0.569924 -0.37 0.715 -1.32522 0.908841 
_cons -1.43269 4.821336 -0.3 0.766 -10.8823 8.016954 
 /lnsig2u 4.689271 
    sigma_u 1.987892 
    Rho 0.847665 (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
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TABLE 4: NOI Ratio GLS Regression with Expense Line Items 
Random Effects GLS Regression Number of Observations 1873 
Group Variable: (i): Project_ID Number of groups 578 
R-squared within 0.1601 Observations per group: min 1 
Between 0.1725 Average 3.2 
Overall 0.1599 Max 6 
Random Effects u_i ~ Gaussian Wald chi2(20) 355.67 
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed) Prob > chi2 0 
NOI Ratio Coefficient Standard Error z P>z 95% Confidence Interval 
Revenue Ratio 4.351869 0.362438 12.01 0 3.641503 5.062235 
Administrative Ratio 0.004221 0.005533 0.76 0.445 -0.00662 0.015065 
Utilities Ratio -0.10361 0.058144 -1.78 0.075 -0.21757 0.010347 
Repairs Ratio -0.33845 0.052698 -6.42 0 -0.44174 -0.23517 
Taxes Ratio -0.0087 0.019432 -0.45 0.654 -0.04679 0.029386 
Insurance Ratio 0.046928 0.055734 0.84 0.4 -0.06231 0.156165 
Management Fee Ratio -0.47439 0.128348 -3.7 0 -0.72595 -0.22284 
Other Expenses Ratio -0.00648 0.009868 -0.66 0.511 -0.02583 0.012857 
Gross Potential Rent Ratio -1.95276 0.486296 -4.02 0 -2.90588 -0.99964 
Vacancies / Concessions  
Ratio -0.16634 0.04197 -3.96 0 -0.2486 -0.08408 
Occupancy -0.9733 0.576268 -1.69 0.091 -2.10277 0.15616 
Age 2.25E-05 5.93E-05 0.38 0.705 -9.4E-05 0.000139 
Family 0.728107 0.543722 1.34 0.181 -0.33757 1.793783 
Senior 0.66069 0.558424 1.18 0.237 -0.4338 1.755181 
Native American -0.90946 0.820327 -1.11 0.268 -2.51728 0.698349 
Special Needs -0.21064 0.193756 -1.09 0.277 -0.5904 0.169113 
SRO -0.2898 0.518263 -0.56 0.576 -1.30557 0.725979 
Support Services -0.25046 0.164848 -1.52 0.129 -0.57355 0.07264 
Region Northeast -0.46553 0.23437 -1.99 0.047 -0.92488 -0.00617 
Region Mid-Atlantic -0.54238 0.175704 -3.09 0.002 -0.88675 -0.19801 
Region Central -0.32791 0.220803 -1.49 0.138 -0.76068 0.104852 
Region West Dropped because of collinearity. Strong positive association.  
Construction New Dropped because of collinearity. Strong positive association.  
Construction  
Moderate Rehab 0.05622 0.221795 0.25 0.8 -0.37849 0.49093 
Construction 
Substantial Rehab -0.28505 0.189383 -1.51 0.132 -0.65623 0.086131 
Construction Mixed 0.101432 0.317728 0.32 0.75 -0.5213 0.724167 
Location Suburban Dropped because of collinearity. Small positive association.  
Location Urban -0.11249 0.206223 -0.55 0.585 -0.51668 0.291698 
Location Rural -0.16092 0.231564 -0.69 0.487 -0.61478 0.292935 
_cons 0.191404 2.313763 0.08 0.934 -4.34349 4.726295 
 




    sigma_u 1.39475 
    Rho 0.492928 (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
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TABLE 5: Negative Cash Flow Logistic Regression Controlling for Property Condition (2007 only) 
Logistic Regression Number of observations 701 




Psudo R2 .4555 
Negative Cash Flow Coefficient Standard Error z P>z 95% Confidence Interval 
Revenue Ratio -10.4853 1.818327 -5.77 0 -14.0492 -6.92145 
Operating Expense Ratio 7.050325 0.728531 9.68 0 5.622431 8.47822 
Gross Potential Rent Ratio -3.11144 1.91546 -1.62 0.104 -6.86568 0.642789 
Vacancies / Concessions  
Ratio 0.524258 0.151418 3.46 0.001 0.227485 0.821032 
Occupancy 2.062358 1.75985 1.17 0.241 -1.38688 5.5116 
Age 4.94E-05 0.000112 0.44 0.658 -0.00017 0.000268 
Family 0.424221 0.788488 0.54 0.591 -1.12119 1.969629 
Senior -0.20246 0.817469 -0.25 0.804 -1.80467 1.399752 
Native American 2.106649 1.206037 1.75 0.081 -0.25714 4.470439 
Special Needs 0.235066 0.292322 0.8 0.421 -0.33788 0.808007 
SRO -0.14904 0.725524 -0.21 0.837 -1.57104 1.272965 
Support Services 0.161166 0.264751 0.61 0.543 -0.35774 0.68007 
Region Northeast -0.32525 0.514554 -0.63 0.527 -1.33375 0.68326 
Region Mid-Atlantic 1.327337 0.37118 3.58 0 0.599838 2.054836 
Region Central 1.233768 0.369808 3.34 0.001 0.508957 1.958578 
Region West Dropped because of collinearity. Strong positive association.  
Construction New Dropped because of collinearity. Strong positive association.  
Construction  
Moderate Rehab 0.174295 0.397983 0.44 0.661 -0.60574 0.954328 
Construction 
Substantial Rehab 0.932637 0.316341 2.95 0.003 0.31262 1.552654 
Construction Mixed 0.433738 0.58543 0.74 0.459 -0.71368 1.581159 
Location Suburban Dropped because of collinearity. Small positive association.  
Location Urban 0.23563 0.368372 0.64 0.522 -0.48637 0.957627 
Location Rural 1.181979 0.433702 2.73 0.006 0.331939 2.032019 
Condition Excellent 1.47462 1.557828 0.95 0.344 -1.57867 4.527907 
Condition Good 1.594424 1.538923 1.04 0.3 -1.42181 4.610657 
Condition Satisfactory 2.339273 1.565514 1.49 0.135 -0.72908 5.407625 
Condition Poor 2.371681 1.861638 1.27 0.203 -1.27706 6.020424 
_cons -7.06131 4.206043 -1.68 0.093 -15.305 1.182384 
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TABLE 6: NOI Ratio Regression Controlling for Property Condition (2007 only) 
Source SS Df MS Number of observations 706 
Model 1401.736 24 58.40565 F( 24,   681) 2.01 
Residual 19766.34 681 29.02547 Prob > F 0.003 
Total 21168.08 705 30.02565 R-squared 0.0662 
  
  Adj R-squared 0.0333 
  
  Root MSE 5.3875 
NOI Ratio Coefficient Standard Error t P>t 95% Confidence Interval 
Revenue Ratio 5.155245 1.666676 3.09 0.002 1.882804 8.427686 
Operating Expense Ratio -3.03855 0.679327 -4.47 0 -4.37237 -1.70472 
Gross Potential Rent Ratio 0.553851 2.063922 0.27 0.789 -3.49857 4.606267 
Vacancies / Concessions  
Ratio -0.14367 0.19714 -0.73 0.466 -0.53074 0.243408 
Occupancy -0.23013 2.938755 -0.08 0.938 -6.00024 5.539974 
Age -0.000022 0.00018 -0.12 0.901 -0.00038 0.000331 
Family 0.75734 1.44489 0.52 0.6 -2.07964 3.594315 
Senior 0.802951 1.489548 0.54 0.59 -2.12171 3.727609 
Native American -0.69914 1.547644 -0.45 0.652 -3.73787 2.339589 
Special Needs 0.614184 0.516717 1.19 0.235 -0.40037 1.628735 
SRO -0.42749 1.339942 -0.32 0.75 -3.05841 2.203419 
Support Services -0.4537 0.48005 -0.95 0.345 -1.39626 0.488853 
Region Northeast 0.280678 0.647475 0.43 0.665 -0.99061 1.551964 
Region Mid-Atlantic -0.26933 0.554142 -0.49 0.627 -1.35736 0.818704 
Region Central 0.112762 0.699558 0.16 0.872 -1.26079 1.486311 
Region West Dropped because of collinearity. Strong positive association.  
Construction New Dropped because of collinearity. Strong positive association.  
Construction  
Moderate Rehab -0.01786 0.706797 -0.03 0.98 -1.40562 1.369904 
Construction 
Substantial Rehab -0.1052 0.586788 -0.18 0.858 -1.25734 1.046927 
Construction Mixed -0.03136 1.120334 -0.03 0.978 -2.23108 2.168363 
Location Suburban Dropped because of collinearity. Small positive association.  
Location Urban -0.15244 0.491956 -0.31 0.757 -1.11666 0.811773 
Location Rural -0.20819 0.569924 -0.37 0.715 -1.32522 0.908841 
Condition Excellent -0.12957 0.611723 -0.21 0.832 -1.33066 1.071521 
Condition Good -0.21205 0.7132 -0.3 0.766 -1.61238 1.188286 
Condition Satisfactory 0.192406 1.475855 0.13 0.896 -2.70537 3.090179 
Condition Poor 0.209262 1.434798 0.15 0.884 -2.6079 3.026421 
_cons 1.528863 1.52363 1 0.316 -1.46271 4.520441 
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TABLE 7: Revenue Ratio GLS Regression 
Random Effects GLS Regression Number of observations 3882 
Group Variable: (i): Project_ID Number of groups 962 
R-squared within 0.4436 Observations per group: min 1 
Between 0.8069 Average 4 
Overall 0.693 Max 6 
Random Effects u_i ~ Gaussian Wald chi2(20) 7250.96 
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed) Prob > chi2 0 
Revenue Ratio Coefficient Standard Error z P>z 95% Confidence Interval 
Gross Potential Rent Ratio 0.943065 0.011719 80.47 0 0.920096 0.966034 
Occupancy 0.349092 0.031621 11.04 0 0.287117 0.411068 
Age 1.68E-05 2.56E-06 6.56 0 1.18E-05 2.18E-05 
Family -0.01776 0.017775 -1 0.318 -0.0526 0.017073 
Senior -0.02674 0.018165 -1.47 0.141 -0.06234 0.008867 
Native American 0.048027 0.019167 2.51 0.012 0.010461 0.085593 
Special Needs -0.0056 0.007388 -0.76 0.448 -0.02008 0.008879 
SRO -0.01967 0.016606 -1.18 0.236 -0.05221 0.012881 
Support Services 0.012164 0.006533 1.86 0.063 -0.00064 0.024968 
Region Mid-Atlantic 0.024866 0.008407 2.96 0.003 0.008389 0.041344 
Region Central 0.019398 0.010477 1.85 0.064 -0.00114 0.039931 
Region West 0.015659 0.008258 1.9 0.058 -0.00053 0.031846 
Region Northeast Dropped because of collinearity. No association. 
Construction Substantial Rehab Dropped because of collinearity. No association. 
Construction Moderate 
Rehab -0.00742 0.010258 -0.72 0.47 -0.02752 0.012691 
Construction Mixed -0.01429 0.014362 -0.99 0.32 -0.04243 0.013863 
Construction New 0.000479 0.0075 0.06 0.949 -0.01422 0.015179 
Location Suburban Dropped because of collinearity. No association.  
Location Urban -0.0004 0.008007 -0.05 0.96 -0.01609 0.015291 
Location Rural -0.00484 0.009362 -0.52 0.605 -0.02319 0.013505 
_cons -0.45868 0.082776 -5.54 0 -0.62092 -0.29645 
 /lnsig2u 0.042058 
    sigma_u 0.131292 
    Rho 0.093067 (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
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TABLE 8: Revenue Ratio Regression Controlling for Property Condition (2007 only) 
Source SS Df MS Number of observations 713 
Model 42.88789 24 1.786995 F( 24,   681) 91.42 
Residual 13.44803 688 0.019547 Prob > F 0 
Total 56.33592 712 0.079123 R-squared 0.7613 
  
  Adj R-squared 0.753 
  
  Root MSE 0.13981 
Revenue Ratio Coefficient Standard Error t P>t 95% Confidence Interval 
Gross Potential Rent Ratio 0.989702 0.022593 43.81 0 0.945342 1.034061 
Occupancy 0.275321 0.066904 4.12 0 0.14396 0.406683 
Age 0.000017 4.94E-06 3.43 0.001 7.26E-06 2.67E-05 
Family -0.03027 0.036677 -0.83 0.409 -0.10229 0.04174 
Senior -0.03479 0.03794 -0.92 0.359 -0.10928 0.039701 
Native American 0.077804 0.040202 1.94 0.053 -0.00113 0.156738 
Special Needs 0.013063 0.013539 0.96 0.335 -0.01352 0.039645 
SRO -0.03369 0.033795 -1 0.319 -0.10005 0.03266 
Support Services -0.00924 0.012414 -0.74 0.457 -0.03361 0.015137 
Region Mid-Atlantic 0.03508 0.017083 2.05 0.04 0.001539 0.068621 
Region Central 0.010748 0.021335 0.5 0.615 -0.03114 0.052638 
Region West 0.020487 0.016722 1.23 0.221 -0.01235 0.053319 
Region Northeast Dropped because of collinearity. No association.  
Construction Substantial Rehab Dropped because of collinearity. No association.  
Construction Moderate 
Rehab -0.02592 0.019417 -1.34 0.182 -0.06404 0.012201 
Construction Mixed -0.02433 0.030146 -0.81 0.42 -0.08352 0.03486 
Construction New -0.00797 0.015154 -0.53 0.599 -0.03772 0.021785 
Location Suburban Dropped because of collinearity. No association.  
Location Urban -0.02174 0.038464 -0.57 0.572 -0.09726 0.053784 
Location Rural -0.01228 0.039456 -0.31 0.756 -0.08975 0.065191 
Condition Excellent -0.02087 0.037238 -0.56 0.575 -0.09399 0.052239 
Condition Good 0.071304 0.058912 1.21 0.227 -0.04437 0.186973 
Condition Satisfactory -0.35614 0.175561 -2.03 0.043 -0.70084 -0.01144 
Condition Poor -0.02174 0.038464 -0.57 0.572 -0.09726 0.053784 
_cons -0.01228 0.039456 -0.31 0.756 -0.08975 0.065191 
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TABLE 9: Operating Expense Ratio GLS Regression 
Random Effects GLS Regression Number of observations 3876 
Group Variable: (i): Project_ID Number of groups 961 
R-squared within 0.0003 Observations per group: min 1 
Between 0.0546 Average 4 
Overall 0.0415 Max 6 
Random Effects u_i ~ Gaussian Wald chi2(20) 57.19 
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed) Prob > chi2 0 
Operating Expense Ratio Coefficient Standard Error z P>z 95% Confidence Interval 
Occupancy .00775E .00676E 1.15 0.251 -0.05497 0.209987 
Age -.000827 .000930 -0.89 0.374 -2.7E-05 9.96E-06 
Family 0.011443 0.070983 0.16 0.872 -0.12768 0.150568 
Senior -0.04535 0.072295 -0.63 0.53 -0.18705 0.096342 
Native American 0.074441 0.078857 0.94 0.345 -0.08012 0.228999 
Special Needs 0.001481 0.027491 0.05 0.957 -0.0524 0.055363 
SRO -0.04648 0.067005 -0.69 0.488 -0.17781 0.084848 
Support Services 0.046299 0.025168 1.84 0.066 -0.00303 0.095628 
Region Mid-Atlantic -0.00867 0.032289 -0.27 0.788 -0.07196 0.054611 
Region Central -0.05065 0.039316 -1.29 0.198 -0.12771 0.026406 
Region West 0.017698 0.031736 0.56 0.577 -0.0445 0.079899 
Region Northeast Dropped because of collinearity. No association. 
Construction Substantial Rehab Dropped because of collinearity. No association. 
Construction Moderate 
Rehab -0.03308 0.03902 -0.85 0.397 -0.10956 0.043395 
Construction Mixed -0.01485 0.056487 -0.26 0.793 -0.12556 0.095863 
Construction New 0.011628 0.028818 0.4 0.687 -0.04485 0.068111 
Location Suburban Dropped because of collinearity. No association.  
Location Urban 0.073314 0.03122 2.35 0.019 0.012123 0.134505 
Location Rural -0.03902 0.036142 -1.08 0.28 -0.10985 0.031822 
_cons 1.140964 0.314374 3.63 0 0.524803 1.757125 
 sigma_u 0.290727 
    sigma_e 0.240402 
    rho 0.593908 (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
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TABLE 10: Operating Expense Ratio Regression Controlling for Property Condition (2007 only) 
Source SS Df MS Number of observations 712 
Model 9.45723 23 0.411184 F( 24,   681) 2.43 
Residual 116.5694 688 0.169432 Prob > F 0.0002 
Total 126.0266 711 0.177253 R-squared 0.075 
  
  Adj R-squared 0.0441 
  
  Root MSE 0.41162 
Revenue Ratio Coefficient Standard Error t P>t 95% Confidence Interval 
Occupancy 0.711649 0.194593 3.66 0 0.329581 1.093716 
Age -4.35E-06 1.46E-05 -0.3 0.765 -3.3E-05 2.42E-05 
Family -0.02731 0.109959 -0.25 0.804 -0.2432 0.188589 
Senior -0.062 0.113389 -0.55 0.585 -0.28463 0.160629 
Native American 0.059626 0.118216 0.5 0.614 -0.17248 0.291732 
Special Needs 0.040003 0.039827 1 0.316 -0.0382 0.118201 
SRO -0.08018 0.101975 -0.79 0.432 -0.2804 0.120037 
Support Services 0.030255 0.036529 0.83 0.408 -0.04147 0.101976 
Region Mid-Atlantic 0.017513 0.050131 0.35 0.727 -0.08091 0.11594 
Region Central -0.04098 0.062272 -0.66 0.511 -0.16325 0.081288 
Region West 0.020111 0.049208 0.41 0.683 -0.0765 0.116725 
Region Northeast Dropped because of collinearity. No association.  
Construction Substantial Rehab Dropped because of collinearity. No association.  
Construction Moderate 
Rehab -0.05314 0.057052 -0.93 0.352 -0.16515 0.058881 
Construction Mixed 0.016394 0.088741 0.18 0.853 -0.15784 0.190628 
Construction New -0.00632 0.044628 -0.14 0.887 -0.09394 0.081306 
Location Suburban Dropped because of collinearity. No association.  
Location Urban 0.016785 0.046611 0.36 0.719 -0.07473 0.108302 
Location Rural -0.07993 0.055085 -1.45 0.147 -0.18809 0.02822 
Condition Excellent 0.092007 0.113245 0.81 0.417 -0.13034 0.314355 
Condition Good 0.1065 0.10964 0.97 0.332 -0.10877 0.321769 
Condition Satisfactory 0.266983 0.116126 2.3 0.022 0.038979 0.494987 
Condition Poor 0.548869 0.173397 3.17 0.002 0.208418 0.889321 
_cons 0.544888 0.523145 1.04 0.298 -0.48226 1.57204 
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TABLE 11: Occupancy GLS Regression 
Random Effects GLS Regression Number of observations 3874 
Group Variable: (i): Project_ID Number of groups 961 
R-squared within 0.0281 Observations per group: min 1 
Between 0.2002 Average 4 
Overall 0.136 Max 6 
Random Effects u_i ~ Gaussian Wald chi2(20) 359.88 
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed) Prob > chi2 0 
Occupancy Coefficient Standard Error z P>z 95% Confidence Interval 
NOI Ratio -0.00036 0.000384 -0.93 0.354 -0.00111 0.000397 
Negative Cash Flow -0.0208 0.003042 -6.84 0 -0.02676 -0.01484 
Operating Expense Ratio -1.38E-02 4.38E-03 -3.15 0.002 -2.24E-02 -5.24E-03 
Revenue Ratio 0.061715 0.006379 9.67 0 0.049212 0.074218 
Age 3.37E-06 1.50E-06 2.25 0.025 4.31E-07 6.31E-06 
Family -0.0029 0.01085 -0.27 0.789 -0.02417 0.018364 
Senior 0.014168 0.011045 1.28 0.2 -0.00748 0.035817 
Native American 0.004762 0.011698 0.41 0.684 -0.01817 0.02769 
Special Needs -2.5E-05 0.004342 -0.01 0.995 -0.00854 0.008485 
SRO 0.008057 0.010209 0.79 0.43 -0.01195 0.028065 
Support Services 0.003953 0.003906 1.01 0.312 -0.0037 0.011609 
Region Northeast 0.008889 0.072009 0.12 0.902 -0.13225 0.150024 
Region Mid-Atlantic -0.00858 0.072005 -0.12 0.905 -0.1497 0.132549 
Region Central -0.00928 0.072043 -0.13 0.898 -0.15048 0.131925 
Region West -0.01459 0.072004 -0.2 0.839 -0.15571 0.12654 
Construction Moderate Rehab Dropped because of collinearity. No association. 
Construction New 0.036121 0.005447 6.63 0 0.025446 0.046796 
Construction Substantial Rehab 0.012644 0.006087 2.08 0.038 0.000714 0.024574 
Construction Mixed 0.007393 0.009208 0.8 0.422 -0.01065 0.025439 
Location Rural Dropped because of collinearity. No association.  
Location Urban 0.00597 0.004681 1.28 0.202 -0.0032 0.015144 
Location Suburban 0.016186 0.005601 2.89 0.004 0.005208 0.027163 
_cons 0.77105 0.087262 8.84 0 0.60002 0.94208 
 /lnsig2u 0.035661 
    sigma_u 0.060562 
    Rho 0.257459 (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
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TABLE 12: Occupancy Regression Controlling for Property Condition (2007 only) 
Source SS Df MS Number of observations 712 
Model 1.514499 11 0.137682 F( 24,   681) 21.67 
Residual 4.447582 700 0.006354 Prob > F 0 
Total 5.96208 711 0.008385 R-squared 0.254 
  
  Adj R-squared 0.2423 
  
  Root MSE 0.07971 
Occupancy Coefficient Standard Error t P>t 95% Confidence Interval 
Revenue Ratio 0.069597 0.014028 4.96 0 0.042054 0.09714 
Operating Expense Ratio -0.00115 0.009453 -0.12 0.904 -0.01971 0.017414 
Construction Moderate Rehab Dropped because of collinearity. No association.  
Construction New 0.032078 0.009784 3.28 0.001 0.012868 0.051288 
Construction Substantial Rehab 0.019392 0.010504 1.85 0.065 -0.00123 0.040014 
Construction Mixed 0.02412 0.017935 1.34 0.179 -0.01109 0.059333 
Location Rural Dropped because of collinearity. No association.  
Location Urban 0.014049 0.00816 1.72 0.086 -0.00197 0.030071 
Location Suburban 0.024399 0.010171 2.4 0.017 0.00443 0.044369 
Condition Excellent -0.00655 0.021597 -0.3 0.762 -0.04896 0.035849 
Condition Good -0.00899 0.021125 -0.43 0.67 -0.05047 0.032482 
Condition Satisfactory -0.03228 0.022171 -1.46 0.146 -0.07581 0.011245 
Condition Poor -0.29533 0.031513 -9.37 0 -0.3572 -0.23346 
_cons 0.854635 0.026437 32.33 0 0.80273 0.906541 
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TABLE 13: Gross Potential Rent Ratio GLS Regression 
Random Effects GLS Regression Number of observations 3876 
Group Variable: (i): Project_ID Number of groups 961 
R-squared within 0.2645 Observations per group: min 1 
Between 0.4548 Average 4 
Overall 0.4079 Max 6 
Random Effects u_i ~ Gaussian Wald chi2(20) 1819.26 
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed) Prob > chi2 0 
Gross Potential Rent Ratio Coefficient Standard Error z P>z 95% Confidence Interval 
Occupancy 0.190198 0.031309 6.07 0 0.128834 0.251563 
Operating Expense Ratio 0.299829 0.007341 40.84 0 0.28544 0.314218 
Age 9.65E-06 3.38E-06 2.85 0.004 3.03E-06 1.63E-05 
Family -0.00441 0.02918 -0.15 0.88 -0.0616 0.052783 
Senior 0.001839 0.029712 0.06 0.951 -0.0564 0.060073 
Native American -0.0253 0.032121 -0.79 0.431 -0.08826 0.037652 
Special Needs 0.017089 0.011312 1.51 0.131 -0.00508 0.03926 
SRO -0.02155 0.027379 -0.79 0.431 -0.07521 0.032109 
Support Services -0.02561 0.010294 -2.49 0.013 -0.04579 -0.00544 
Region Northeast -0.01847 0.162746 -0.11 0.91 -0.33744 0.30051 
Region Mid-Atlantic -0.0729 0.162747 -0.45 0.654 -0.39188 0.246077 
Region Central -0.11259 0.162867 -0.69 0.489 -0.4318 0.206627 
Region West -0.04865 0.162769 -0.3 0.765 -0.36767 0.270371 
Construction New -0.05913 0.022198 -2.66 0.008 -0.10264 -0.01562 
Construction Moderate 
Rehab -0.08153 0.024689 -3.3 0.001 -0.12992 -0.03314 
Construction Substantial Rehab -0.05108 0.023239 -2.2 0.028 -0.09663 -0.00553 
Construction Mixed Dropped because of collinearity. No association. 
Location Rural Dropped because of collinearity. No association.  
Location Urban -0.01789 0.012184 -1.47 0.142 -0.04177 0.005986 
Location Suburban -0.0296 0.01476 -2.01 0.045 -0.05853 -0.00067 
_cons 0.529682 0.210183 2.52 0.012 0.117731 0.941632 
 /lnsig2u 0.114324 
    sigma_u 0.111979 
    Rho 0.510362 (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
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TABLE 14: Gross Potential Rent Ratio Regression Controlling for Property Condition (2007 only) 
Source SS Df MS Number of observations 712 
Model 18.79543 11 1.708675 F( 24,   681) 54.26 
Residual 22.04279 700 0.03149 Prob > F 0 
Total 40.83822 711 0.057438 R-squared 0.4602 
  
  Adj R-squared 0.4518 
  
  Root MSE 0.17745 
Gross Potential Rent Ratio Coefficient Standard Error t P>t 95% Confidence Interval 
Occupancy 0.263459 0.082702 3.19 0.002 0.101085 0.425834 
Operating Expense Ratio 0.375264 0.016328 22.98 0 0.343206 0.407322 
Construction New 0.004859 0.02194 0.22 0.825 -0.03822 0.047935 
Construction Moderate Rehab Dropped because of collinearity. No association.  
Construction Substantial Rehab 0.044157 0.023382 1.89 0.059 -0.00175 0.090064 
Construction Mixed 0.036271 0.039966 0.91 0.364 -0.0422 0.114738 
Location Urban -0.01949 0.018148 -1.07 0.283 -0.05512 0.016145 
Location Suburban -0.01973 0.022718 -0.87 0.385 -0.06433 0.024875 
Location Rural Dropped because of collinearity. No association.  
Condition Excellent -0.03745 0.048052 -0.78 0.436 -0.13179 0.056895 
Condition Good -0.06889 0.046942 -1.47 0.143 -0.16105 0.023278 
Condition Satisfactory -0.08249 0.049304 -1.67 0.095 -0.17929 0.01431 
Condition Poor -0.12251 0.074354 -1.65 0.1 -0.2685 0.023469 
_cons 0.371522 0.092755 4.01 0 0.189411 0.553632 
  




TABLE 15: Physical Condition – Excellent, Logistic Regression (2007 only) 
Logistic regression 
 
Number of obs 
 
712 













Condition Excellent Coefficient Standard Error z P>z 95% Confidence Interval 
Operating Expense Ratio -0.87431 0.384401 -2.27 0.023 -1.62773 -0.1209 
Revenue Ratio 1.092985 0.496311 2.2 0.028 0.120233 2.065737 
Occupancy 1.913471 1.713852 1.12 0.264 -1.44562 5.27256 
Family -0.78873 0.752914 -1.05 0.295 -2.26442 0.686953 
Senior 0.171497 0.76055 0.23 0.822 -1.31915 1.662147 
Native American -1.11826 1.073259 -1.04 0.297 -3.22181 0.985286 
Special Needs -0.08687 0.247194 -0.35 0.725 -0.57136 0.397624 
SRO -0.45037 0.685047 -0.66 0.511 -1.79304 0.892299 
Support Services 0.148507 0.223064 0.67 0.506 -0.28869 0.585705 
Region Northeast 1.435327 0.319189 4.5 0 0.809728 2.060927 
Region Mid-Atlantic 0.738435 0.26285 2.81 0.005 0.223259 1.25361 
Region Central 0.807285 0.323563 2.49 0.013 0.173114 1.441457 
Region West Dropped because of collinearity. No association. 
Construction New Dropped because of collinearity. No association. 
Construction Moderate Rehab -1.65435 0.413671 -4 0 -2.46513 -0.84357 
Construction Substantial Rehab -1.0498 0.299412 -3.51 0 -1.63663 -0.46296 
Construction Mixed -0.54825 0.536818 -1.02 0.307 -1.60039 0.503894 
Location Suburban Dropped because of collinearity. No association. 
Location Urban -1.15826 0.264709 -4.38 0 -1.67708 -0.63944 
Location Rural -0.95892 0.308704 -3.11 0.002 -1.56397 -0.35387 
_cons 0.132844 3.526955 0.04 0.97 -6.77986 7.045548 
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TABLE 16: Physical Condition – Good, Logistic Regression (2007 only) 
Logistic regression 
 
Number of obs 
 
712 













Condition Good Coefficient Standard Error z P>z 95% Confidence Interval 
Operating Expense Ratio -0.236197 0.265376 -0.89 0.373 -0.75632 0.28393 
Revenue Ratio -0.4234503 0.395387 -1.07 0.284 -1.19839 0.351493 
Occupancy 2.968026 1.034567 2.87 0.004 0.940311 4.995741 
Family 0.1897246 0.581442 0.33 0.744 -0.94988 1.32933 
Senior -0.0718598 0.597872 -0.12 0.904 -1.24367 1.099947 
Native American -0.8421684 0.579841 -1.45 0.146 -1.97864 0.294299 
Special Needs 0.330988 0.19783 1.67 0.094 -0.05675 0.718727 
SRO 0.5086532 0.530959 0.96 0.338 -0.53201 1.549315 
Support Services -0.0552581 0.177221 -0.31 0.755 -0.4026 0.292088 
Region Northeast -0.4592622 0.242143 -1.9 0.058 -0.93385 0.01533 
Region Mid-Atlantic -0.157868 0.206041 -0.77 0.444 -0.5617 0.245966 
Region Central -0.1402954 0.263928 -0.53 0.595 -0.65758 0.376994 
Region West Dropped because of collinearity. No association. 
Construction New Dropped because of collinearity. No association. 
Construction Moderate Rehab 0.423741 0.262302 1.62 0.106 -0.09036 0.937844 
Construction Substantial Rehab 0.4201648 0.222151 1.89 0.059 -0.01524 0.855573 
Construction Mixed 0.4710901 0.42844 1.1 0.272 -0.36864 1.310816 
Location Suburban Dropped because of collinearity. No association. 
Location Urban 0.4690432 0.226075 2.07 0.038 0.025944 0.912142 
Location Rural 0.875282 0.272178 3.22 0.001 0.341824 1.40874 
_cons -2.578103 2.537715 -1.02 0.31 -7.55193 2.395727 
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TABLE 17: Physical Condition – Satisfactory, Logistic Regression (2007 only) 
Logistic regression 
 
Number of obs 
 
712 













Condition Satisfactory Coefficient Standard Error z P>z 95% Confidence Interval 
Operating Expense Ratio 0.992913 0.329727 3.01 0.003 0.34666 1.639166 
Revenue Ratio -0.51361 0.490936 -1.05 0.295 -1.47583 0.44861 
Occupancy -0.99431 1.026657 -0.97 0.333 -3.00652 1.017905 
Family 0.405835 1.043577 0.39 0.697 -1.63954 2.451209 
Senior -0.8914 1.099787 -0.81 0.418 -3.04694 1.264143 
Native American 1.997314 0.645029 3.1 0.002 0.733081 3.261547 
Special Needs -0.47089 0.282823 -1.66 0.096 -1.02521 0.083432 
SRO -0.99685 0.977702 -1.02 0.308 -2.91311 0.919408 
Support Services 0.059685 0.244457 0.24 0.807 -0.41944 0.538812 
Region Northeast -0.97381 0.339238 -2.87 0.004 -1.63871 -0.30892 
Region Mid-Atlantic -0.31983 0.288765 -1.11 0.268 -0.8858 0.246137 
Region Central -0.4362 0.38836 -1.12 0.261 -1.19738 0.324968 
Region West Dropped because of collinearity. No association. 
Construction New Dropped because of collinearity. No association. 
Construction Moderate Rehab 1.109564 0.33329 3.33 0.001 0.456327 1.7628 
Construction Substantial Rehab 0.935212 0.297152 3.15 0.002 0.352806 1.517619 
Construction Mixed 0.158311 0.596038 0.27 0.791 -1.0099 1.326524 
Location Suburban Dropped because of collinearity. No association. 
Location Urban 1.083351 0.386122 2.81 0.005 0.326565 1.840136 
Location Rural 0.339486 0.48444 0.7 0.483 -0.61 1.288971 
_cons -2.48739 4.241152 -0.59 0.558 -10.7999 5.825111 
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TABLE 18: Physical Condition – Poor, Logistic Regression (2007 only) 
Logistic regression 
 
Number of obs 
 
554 













Condition Poor Coefficient Standard Error z P>z 95% Confidence Interval 
Operating Expense Ratio 1.399512 0.832286 1.68 0.093 -0.23174 3.030764 
Revenue Ratio -0.9401129 1.55606 -0.6 0.546 -3.98994 2.10971 
Occupancy -13.89882 3.949079 -3.52 0 -21.6389 -6.15877 
Family 3.183423 2.307972 1.38 0.168 -1.34012 7.706965 
Senior -0.8302636 1.068406 -0.78 0.437 -2.9243 1.263774 
Native American 2.854583 1.712801 1.67 0.096 -0.50244 6.21161 
Special Needs -1.707048 1.16818 -1.46 0.144 -3.99664 0.582542 
SRO 0.3512873 1.146059 0.31 0.759 -1.89495 2.597522 
Support Services -5.336341 2.564576 -2.08 0.037 -10.3628 -0.30986 
Region Northeast -4.510989 3.940059 -1.14 0.252 -12.2334 3.211385 
Region Mid-Atlantic 1.399512 0.832286 1.68 0.093 -0.23174 3.030764 
Region Central -0.9401129 1.55606 -0.6 0.546 -3.98994 2.10971 
Region West Dropped because of collinearity. No association. 
Construction New Dropped because of collinearity. No association. 
Construction Moderate Rehab 1.468406 1.296447 1.13 0.257 -1.07258 4.009396 
Construction Substantial Rehab 0.9765022 1.411772 0.69 0.489 -1.79052 3.743524 
Construction Mixed 3.811934 1.707172 2.23 0.026 0.465939 7.157929 
Location Suburban Dropped because of collinearity. No association. 
Location Urban -0.8163891 1.167233 -0.7 0.484 -3.10412 1.471346 
Location Rural -1.542998 1.673071 -0.92 0.356 -4.82216 1.736162 
_cons 1.851088 7.279566 0.25 0.799 -12.4166 16.11877 
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TABLE 19: Repairs Ratio Regression Controlling for Property Condition (2007 only) 
Source SS Df MS Number of observations 713 
Model 267.8768 10 26.78768 F( 24,   681) 31.71 
Residual 593.0646 702 0.844821 Prob > F 0 
Total 860.9414 712 1.209187 R-squared 0.3111 
  
  Adj R-squared 0.3013 
  
  Root MSE 0.91914 
Repairs Ratio Coefficient Standard Error t P>t 95% Confidence Interval 
Operating Expense Ratio 1.42091 0.083616 16.99 0 1.256743 1.585078 
Construction Mixed Dropped because of collinearity. Very little association  
Construction  
Moderate Rehab -0.22157 0.206676 -1.07 0.284 -0.62735 0.184206 
Construction 
Substantial Rehab -0.1871 0.191709 -0.98 0.329 -0.56349 0.189296 
Construction New -0.27929 0.188232 -1.48 0.138 -0.64886 0.090273 
Location Rural Dropped because of collinearity. Very little association  
Location Urban -0.09324 0.093656 -1 0.32 -0.27712 0.090638 
Location Suburban 0.046488 0.117355 0.4 0.692 -0.18392 0.276897 
Condition Excellent -0.02821 0.248697 -0.11 0.91 -0.51649 0.460067 
Condition Good 0.096949 0.243073 0.4 0.69 -0.38029 0.574185 
Condition Satisfactory 0.200776 0.254768 0.79 0.431 -0.29942 0.700974 
Condition Poor -0.41125 0.361008 -1.14 0.255 -1.12004 0.297531 
_cons 0.097059 0.326546 0.3 0.766 -0.54406 0.738182 
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TABLE 20: Repairs Ratio / Occupancy GLS Regression 
Random Effects GLS Regression Number of Observations 3850 
Group Variable: (i): Project_ID Number of groups 958 
R-squared within 0.0027 Observations per group: min 1 
Between 0.0353 Average 4 
Overall 0.0227 Max 6 
Random Effects u_i ~ Gaussian Wald chi2(20) 42.5 
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed) Prob > chi2 0 
Repairs Ratio Coefficient Standard Error z P>z 95% Confidence Interval 
Occupancy 0.391575 0.198623 1.97 0.049 0.002282 0.780868 
Construction Mod Rehab Dropped because of collinearity. No association.  
Construction New -0.12128 0.08172 -1.48 0.138 -0.28144 0.038893 
Construction 
Substantial Rehab -0.00124 0.091442 -0.01 0.989 -0.18046 0.177984 
Construction Mixed 0.132486 0.143614 0.92 0.356 -0.14899 0.413964 
Location Rural Dropped because of collinearity. No association.  
Location Urban 0.158875 0.068071 2.33 0.02 0.025459 0.292291 
Location Suburban 0.085387 0.084534 1.01 0.312 -0.0803 0.25107 
Region Northeast 1.042121 0.977928 1.07 0.287 -0.87458 2.958824 
Region Mid-Atlantic 1.098425 0.978393 1.12 0.262 -0.81919 3.01604 
Region Central 0.871268 0.979929 0.89 0.374 -1.04936 2.791893 
Region West 1.246646 0.978444 1.27 0.203 -0.67107 3.164361 
_cons -0.02584 0.999976 -0.03 0.979 -1.98576 1.934073 
 /lnsig2u 0.648629 
    sigma_u 0.713355 
    Rho 0.452583 (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
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TABLE 21: Repairs Ratio / Gross Potential Rent GLS Regression 
Random Effects GLS Regression Number of Observations 3866 
Group Variable: (i): Project_ID Number of groups 959 
R-squared within 0.0549 Observations per group: min 1 
Between 0.1169 Average 4 
Overall 0.1132 Max 6 
Random Effects u_i ~ Gaussian Wald chi2(20) 309.45 
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed) Prob > chi2 0 
Repairs Ratio Coefficient Standard Error z P>z 95% Confidence Interval 
Gross Potential Rent Ratio 1.311673 0.080229 16.35 0 1.154428 1.468919 
Construction Mod Rehab Dropped because of collinearity. No association.  
Construction New -0.1595 0.077941 -2.05 0.041 -0.31226 -0.00674 
Construction 
Substantial Rehab -0.04206 0.087457 -0.48 0.631 -0.21347 0.129355 
Construction Mixed 0.020074 0.13739 0.15 0.884 -0.2492 0.289353 
Location Suburban Dropped because of collinearity. No association.  
Location Urban 0.02955 0.069948 0.42 0.673 -0.10755 0.166645 
Location Rural -0.10867 0.080665 -1.35 0.178 -0.26677 0.049429 
Region Northeast 0.959351 0.940509 1.02 0.308 -0.88401 2.802716 
Region Mid-Atlantic 1.095139 0.940918 1.16 0.244 -0.74903 2.939304 
Region Central 0.928238 0.942385 0.98 0.325 -0.9188 2.775279 
Region West 1.194744 0.940973 1.27 0.204 -0.64953 3.039018 
_cons -0.79903 0.947329 -0.84 0.399 -2.65576 1.057698 
 /lnsig2u 0.618156 
    sigma_u 0.693166 
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